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Religions, Fertility and Growth in South-East Asia

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Religions, Fertility, and Growth in South-East Asia

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Abstract

Through indirect inference, we investigate the extent to which religions' supposed pronatalism is detrimental to growth via the fertility/education channel. Using censuses from South-East Asia, we first estimate an empirical model of fertility and show that having a religious affiliation significantly raises fertility. This effect is stronger for couples with intermediate to high education levels. We next use these estimates to identify the parameters of a structural model of fertility choice. On average, catholicism is the most pro-child religion (increasing spending on children), followed by Buddhism, while Islam has a strong pro-birth component (redirecting spending from quality to quantity). We show that pro-child religions depress growth in the early stages by lowering saving, physical capital, and labor supply. These effects account for 10% to 50% of the actual growth gaps between countries over 1950-1980. At later stages of growth, pro-birth religions lower human capital accumulation, explaining between 10% and 20% of the gap between Muslim and Buddhist countries over 1980-2010.

Keywords: Quality-quantity tradeoff, Catholicism, Buddhism, Islam, Education, Saving
JEL Classification numbers: J13, Z13, O11

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1 Introduction

Many religions are theoretically pro-natalist, to varying degrees. The Catholic doctrine promotes fertility by discouraging sexual intercourse other than for reproductive purposes, therefore forbidding contraceptive use and abortion, because men “must also recognize that an act of mutual love which impairs the capacity to transmit life which God the Creator, through specific laws, has built into it, frustrates His design which constitutes the norm of marriage, and contradicts the will of the Author of life.” (Encyclical Letter *Humanae Vitae* Section 13).¹ In Islam, “procreation is a sign of God’s will and a large family is perceived as a blessing” (Blyth and Landau 2009), although the Koran does not take a firm position on contraception, leaving room for interpretation by local religious leaders. Buddhism’s sacred texts are more silent about family issues, but Buddhism also displays pro-family features: Guanyin, the Bodhisattva of compassion and mercy, is portrayed as a fertility goddess who has the power to grant children, especially sons, and to ensure safe childbirth (Lee et al. 2009).

What implications do these beliefs have for economic growth? We know from empirical studies using microdata that belonging to a religious denomination indeed increases fertility. In addition, from the family economics literature, we know that there is a trade-off between fertility and education, i.e. between the quantity of children and the quality of those children’s education.² Finally, the growth literature suggests that increased fertility may slow down human capital accumulation through this trade-off, as well as physical capital accumulation, as in the standard Solow model. The objective of this paper is to link these three mechanisms and examine the extent to which religion may affect growth through these channels. We thus first identify the impact of religion on fertility at the microeconomic level. We then map the identified effect into a macroeconomic model to infer consequences for economic growth. South-East Asia will provide the ideal ground to study this question, as its countries welcome most of the major world religions in a small geographical area, allowing therefore to distinguish country fixed effects (related to colonial origin, legal system, etc.) from religion fixed effects.

To analyze how fertility behavior changes as a function of religious affiliation, we do not model religion as a choice, but rather look at how religion, in most cases inherited from the parents, affects households’ incentives. We assume that incentives are affected by religion

¹Similarly, “Children are really the supreme gift of marriage and contribute in the highest degree to their parents’ welfare.” (Encyclical Letter *Humanae Vitae* Section 9). While they have no central authority to diffuse this message across the world, other Christian denominations are also pro-natalist religions, following the Bible’s commandment to “be fruitful, and multiply” (Genesis 1:28).

²See Doepke (2015) for a survey on the emergence of this concept.

through preferences, either that those preferences result from ideology, or that they were shaped by socialization (Mosher, Williams, and David 1992). Looking through the lenses of an optimal fertility model where parents choose the number and the quality (health and level of education) of their children, we assume that religious values can affect fertility behaviors through two different channels. Religion can be *pro-child* if it leads people to put more weight on the number and quality of children, as opposed to their own consumption and saving. It is *pro-birth* if it leads people to put more weight on the sole number of children with respect to the other components of utility. We will see that these two features of religion affect differently the relationship between parents' education and their fertility.

To identify these theoretical channels, we use indirect inference, a simulation method that allows the estimation of structural parameters from a standard fertility regression without imposing *a priori* restrictions on the econometric model. Indirect inference follows a two-step procedure. We first estimate an auxiliary model to capture aspects of the data – here the effect of parents' education and religion on fertility – upon which to base the subsequent estimation of the structural model. We then choose the parameters of the structural economic model such that they minimize the distance between the estimations of the parameters of the auxiliary model obtained with the observed data and those obtained with artificial data simulated from the structural model (Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault (1993), Smith (2008)). Once the parameters have been identified, we use the structural model to simulate the influence of religion on growth. We then run experiments to compute the impact of religion on the growth process of artificial countries populated by non religious, Catholic, Buddhist or Muslim citizens. We finally simulate the effect of religion on the growth path of real countries taking their religious composition into account.

In the first step, we estimate the empirical relationship between parental background and fertility, including religion and education. Religion is modelled as affecting both the level of fertility and the marginal effect of parents' education on fertility. We use pooled census data from South-East Asian countries for which religious affiliation is available as an individual variable (Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam). South-East Asia is a particularly rich region in terms of religious affiliations both within and across countries: Catholics are present in the Philippines, as well as in Indonesia and Vietnam. Buddhist and Muslims are present in all of the countries we consider (except in Vietnam for Muslims). People with no religious affiliation are a majority in Vietnam and form small minorities everywhere else. As we want to study the interaction effects of couples' education and religion, pooling censuses allows us to have enough observations in each category (for example, couples with no religious affiliation who both have a university degree).

Three main features emerge. First, fertility decreases as both the mother and the father become more educated. Second, belonging to any religious affiliation (except Hinduism) raises fertility. Third, the effect of religion on fertility varies with the couple's level of education. Catholicism has the strongest effect on fertility, but all well represented religions raise fertility especially for couples with intermediate and high levels of education.

In the second step, we estimate the parameters of a structural model of optimal fertility, using the fertility-religion relationship estimated in the first step as the "auxiliary" model. Catholicism clearly displays a pro-child effect. Moreover, the fertility pattern of religious women points to strong pro-birth effects, in particular for Muslim couples, and, to a lesser extent, for Buddhists and Catholics. This is true when one takes into account the interaction between religion and education in the auxiliary model: the highly educated couples with a religious denomination, and Muslims in particular, do not reduce their fertility as much as predicted by the behaviour of non-religious couples, as if the quantity/quality substitution mechanism were less at play for them.

The consequences for growth depend strongly on the size of the pro-birth effect. Indeed, if religion only increases the taste for children (pro-child), it leads to more spending on children and less saving. It may therefore depress growth temporarily through physical capital accumulation but not through human capital accumulation. These temporary effects account for 10% to 50% of the actual growth gaps between countries over 1950-1980. On the contrary, if religion also decreases the relative weight of quality over quantity (pro-birth), it depresses growth permanently through human capital accumulation. We show that countries with a large population affiliated to pro-birth religions have a lower human capital accumulation. In particular, religious composition explains between 10% and 20% of the gap between Muslim and Buddhist countries over 1980-2010.

These results can hardly be compared with the existing literature, as this paper is the first to take the full journey from microdata estimates to growth simulations. Qualitatively, our effects in the auxiliary model are in line with the vast empirical literature at the micro level which shows that fertility choices can be heavily affected by the partners' religion and/or religiosity. For example, Sander (1992) shows that Catholic norms have a highly significant positive effect on fertility for respondents born before 1920 in the United Kingdom. Adsera (2006a, 2006b) shows that, in a secular society, religion predicts both a higher fertility norm and actual fertility. Baudin (2012) has similar findings on French data. As far as developing countries are concerned, Heaton (2011) studies the effect of religion on fertility in a set of 22 developing countries using survey data. He shows that the level of educational achievements matter for this relationship, stressing the importance of interaction effects, which is also a conclusion of our auxiliary model. Chabé-Ferret (2013) shows that controlling for

religious affiliation matters in understanding fertility behavior of migrants in France. In particular, controlling for religion reduces the effect of fertility norms from the origin country. Finally, Skirbekk et al. (2015) study the effect of Buddhism in several Asian countries, and claim that it is the less pro-natalist religion. Although most of these studies control for the education level of the mother, few of them control for the education level of the father, and none of them allows, like we do, for interaction between education and religion.

There is also an empirical literature at the macroeconomic level linking religion to growth. The debate goes back, at least, to Weber, who praised the virtues of Protestant ethics for economic growth. Along Weberian lines, Becker and Woessmann (2009) and Boppart et al. (2013) show that Protestantism led to better education in nineteenth-century Prussian counties and in Swiss districts, compared to Catholicism. This difference between Catholics and Protestants is however not visible in our study. It should be noted, though, that Protestantism is far from being uniform. McCleary (2013) compares Protestant missionaries in Korea and Guatemala and show that their approach to exporting Protestantism was different, with a focus on education in Korea from mainline denominations but little investment in human capital in Guatemala, from fundamentalist denominations. These differences in approaches might not be unrelated to the growth success of Korea versus Guatemala.

Using contemporaneous data, Barro and McCleary (2003) attempt to isolate the direction of causation from religiosity to economic performance, and find a negative effect of religious practice on growth; however their results are shown not robust by Durlauf, Kourtellos, and Tan (2006). Berman, Iannaccone, and Ragusa (2012) show that fertility across European countries is related to the population density of nuns, who are likely to provide services to families, alleviating childrearing costs.

Several authors propose growth models embedding religious concerns. Some, like us, consider religion as exogenous. Cavalcanti, Parente, and Zhao (2007) explicitly models an after-life period (heaven or hell) in an overlapping generation set-up, and show that beliefs about how to maximize one's chance to go to heaven affect capital accumulation. Strulik (2012) defends the view that religion may affect preferences, either for fertility or leisure (individuals with "religious" values attach a lower weight to consumption utility than individuals with "secular" values). Compared to our model in which religion is treated as an exogenous difference in the parameters, the interest of Strulik (2012) is to make religious affiliation endogenous. Endogenous religion is also modeled by Baudin (2010), who studies the joint dynamics of cultural values and fertility, and shows the conditions under which a demographic transition accompanied by a rise in "modern" (vs. "traditional") culture happens. Finally, Cervellati, Jansen, and Sunde (2014) model religion as insurance against idiosyncratic shocks, and determine which system of religious norm is incentive compatible. They

explicitly show how individual incentives are modified by religious norms, which is what we assume when we will make preferences depend directly on religious affiliation. None of these theoretical models, however, provides a quantitative measure of their implications disciplined by microeconomic estimates.

The layout of the remainder of the article is as follows. Section 2 presents and estimates the auxiliary model of fertility. We develop the structural model in Section 3. Section 4 uses a growth model to infer dynamic and long-run implications of religion on fertility, education and growth. Section 5 concludes.

2 The Auxiliary Model

We specify an auxiliary model to estimate the marginal effects of education on fertility. This in turn will be used to estimate the parameters of the structural economic model such that the distance between these empirical marginal effects and those obtained from the structural model is minimal.

2.1 Data and Empirical Strategy

Our analysis uses data from the Integrated Public Use Micro Series, International (IPUMS-I) (Minnesota Population Center 2013). The IPUMS-I census microdata are unique in providing internationally comparable, detailed information on demographics, religion and education. We restrict our analysis to South-East Asia because it covers a variety of religions while still having common historical, cultural, and geographical influences,³ thus reducing the noise inherent to a cross-country analysis. Harmonized data for South-East Asia come from 11 censuses collected by national statistical agencies in Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam between 1970 and 2008. All results presented here are weighted to adjust for different sampling probabilities across countries.

As our theory will be based on the model of a couple, and our identification requires to know the education level of the husband, we restrict the sample to married women, excluding divorced and widowed women. To focus the analysis on completed fertility, we restrict the sample to married women aged between 45 and 70 at the time of the census. For countries

³According to Putterman (2006), transition to agriculture took place from 6000 (Vietnam) before present to 4000 (Indonesia). Following Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013), the plough was used in pre-historical times in all six countries considered, which is important for shaping gender roles. A large part of the population lives close to the sea, and stilt houses are common all over South-East Asia. Climate is tropical everywhere but North Vietnam where it is temperate.

with several censuses, we further restrict the age span to avoid including the same cohort several times in the analysis. For instance, in Malaysia, the sample includes married women aged between 50 and 70 in the 1998 census (born between 1928 and 1948), and aged between 45 and 59 in the 2008 census (born between 1949 and 1963). For the cohort born between 1938 and 1948, we use data from the 1998 census (when they are aged between 50 and 60) rather than from the 2008 census (when they are aged between 60 and 70) to reduce the chances of sample loss due to mortality. Figure 1 shows the cohorts used in all 11 censuses.




Figure 1: Age groups per census in selected East Asian countries

Fertility is measured for each woman by the number of children ever born. In Vietnam and the Philippines, only women below 49 years old were asked about fertility. In these two countries, our sample is thus restricted to married women aged between 45 and 49. To avoid outliers, we drop observations for which fertility is equal to or higher than 30 children (N=234).

We use detailed information about religion in the six countries to construct religion dummies for (1) Catholic; (2) Protestant and other Christian, including Baptist, Adventist, and Methodist; (3) Buddhist; (4) Hindu; (5) Muslim; (6) Other, including Confucianist and Taoist; and (7) No religion. The measure used in the analysis is that of the woman's religion, as 99 percent of the couples in our sample share the same religion. Moreover, being currently of a certain religion, say Catholic, is a good proxy for a Catholic upbringing.⁴ Censuses in Cambodia, Malaysia and Thailand did not distinguish between Catholics, Protestants and other Christians. Although Protestantism is on the rise in these three countries, Catholics

⁴97 percent of women have the same religion as their mother in the subset of our sample for which we have information on the mother's religion (N=2020).

composed a vast majority of Christians in the period relevant to the birth cohorts of the individuals in our sample, born at the latest in 1963. We thus club Christians in Cambodia, Malaysia and Thailand with Catholics. All the results presented here are robust to clubbing Christians with Protestants and other Christians instead.

For each individual, we distinguish five levels of educational attainment: (1) no education (or pre-school); (2) some primary; (3) primary completed ; (4) secondary completed; (5) university completed. Education categories have been harmonized across countries. We construct the same five educational categories for the woman's husband. We next factor them, thus constructing 25 educational categories for the couple, as presented in Table 1.

Educ.	Education Men					Total
	(i) No schooling	(ii) Some primary	(iii) Primary completed	(iv) Secondary completed	(v) University completed	
Women						
(i)	155,029	89,151	24,542	1,392	113	270,227
(ii)	13,978	109,132	38,078	4,930	541	166,659
(iii)	2,235	16,874	55,567	14,065	2,097	90,838
(iv)	100	1,058	5,234	12,779	3,834	23,005
(v)	17	117	936	3,568	6,581	11,219
Total	171,359	216,332	124,357	36,734	13,166	561,948
Notes: (i) indicates no education; (ii) some primary education; (iii) primary education completed; (iv) secondary education completed; (v) university completed.						

Table 1: Distribution of Education

Table 2 displays summary statistics for the main measures used in the analysis. Panel A shows fertility levels by country. Given that our sample is restricted to married women with completed fertility, fertility levels are relatively high in all countries, varying between 4.17 and 5.88, in Vietnam and Malaysia respectively. Panel B shows the distribution of religion by country.⁵ All countries except Malaysia have a predominant religion (or no religious affiliation for Vietnam), with other religions in minority. This could potentially bias our estimates of the effect of religion on fertility in the empirical analysis. We will discuss this in the next

⁵The distribution of religious groups from census data seems to be somewhat different from Barro's religious adherence data: http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/barro/files/7_religion_adherence_data.xls. The discrepancy comes from the fact that we consider the population aged 40+ only, and that in some special cases, there has been recent changes in religious affiliation (children from Catholic families becoming Protestants, children from atheist parents growing up in communist regimes declaring they are Buddhist in recent surveys).

	Cambodia	Indonesia	Malaysia	Philippines	Vietnam	Thailand
<i>A: Number of children ever born</i>						
Mean	5.49	5.75	5.88	5.24	4.17	4.22
Sd	2.87	3.53	3.23	2.93	2.09	2.88
Min	0	0	0	0	0	0
Max	20	29	23	20	14	25
<i>B: Religion (in %)</i>						
No religious affil.	0.00	0.00	0.72	0.33	80.69	0.04
Buddhist	96.91	1.09	24.31	0.05	10.84	95.43
Hindu	0.00	2.35	6.71	0.00	0.00	0.01
Muslim	2.05	87.08	54.23	4.48	0.01	3.65
Catholic	0.38	2.34	2.57	83.43	5.42	0.74
Protestant/Other Christ	0.00	5.77	0.00	10.58	0.45	0.00
Other	0.66	1.36	11.47	1.14	2.60	0.13
<i>C: Women's Education (in %)</i>						
No schooling	47.0	70.6	74.4	6.9	7.8	27.8
Some primary	34.9	20.8	16.7	28.3	34.1	62.8
Primary completed	16.6	7.7	8.7	40.6	41.5	5.0
Secondary completed	1.4	0.9	0.1	14.1	13.4	3.1
University completed	0.2	0.0	0.1	10.2	3.2	1.3
<i>D: Husband's Education (in %)</i>						
No schooling	23.2	46.3	40.3	6.4	3.9	18.4
Some primary	39.7	37.1	35.3	29.4	25.5	63.9
Primary completed	32.7	14.2	23.4	35.7	45.7	9.9
Secondary completed	3.7	2.2	0.4	20.2	16.9	5.2
University completed	0.7	0.2	0.6	8.3	7.9	2.6
<i>E: Birth year</i>						
Mean	1952	1928	1923	1943	1952	1936
Min	1928	1910	1900	1941	1950	1900
Max	1963	1935	1935	1945	1954	1955

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

subsection. Thailand and Cambodia are mainly Buddhist (97 percent and 95 percent respectively). While a vast majority of Indonesians are Muslim (87 percent), 83 percent of Filipinos are Catholic. Eighty-one percent of the population in Vietnam reports having no religious affiliation. However, this is likely to include individuals adhering to informal religious customs and practices, such as ancestor and local spirits worship. The religious spectrum is more diverse in Malaysia with 54 percent Muslim, 24 percent Buddhist, 11 percent other religions, mostly Confucianist and Taoist, and 7 percent Hindu.

We next report the distribution of educational levels for each country, for women (Panel C) and for their husbands (Panel D). Vietnam shows the highest levels of education with 10 percent of women completing university and 65 percent of women completing at least primary schooling. On the contrary, in Indonesia and Malaysia, most women did not receive any education (71 and 74 percent respectively). In all countries except Vietnam, educational levels are higher for men than for women. Finally, birth cohorts are shown in Panel E: individuals in our sample are born between 1900 and 1963.

Our final sample includes 561,948 women. This is a sufficient sample size for identifying the mean fertility of the 25 combined levels of education of a couple and estimating the marginal effect of religion on fertility for most of these 25 combined levels of education.

2.1.1 Empirical Methods

Our analysis examines the impact of religion and education on fertility. We estimate the parameters of our auxiliary models using an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.

Model A. The benchmark model is as follows:

$$\mathcal{N}_i = \beta_1^A \mathcal{R}_i + \beta_2^A \mathcal{E}_i^f \times \mathcal{E}_i^m + \beta_3^A \mathcal{B}_i + \beta_4^A \mathcal{C}_i + \epsilon_i^A$$

where \mathcal{N}_i is the number of children ever born for woman i , and \mathcal{R}_i is a vector of religion dummies indicating woman i 's religion. The level of education of the couple is indicated by $\mathcal{E}_i^f \times \mathcal{E}_i^m$, a vector of 25 categorical variables. \mathcal{B}_i indicates the birth year of woman i and \mathcal{C}_i accounts for census (country and year) fixed effects. This allows us to isolate the effect of religion from country-specific effects, which is of particular concern in a context where most countries are dominated by one religion. Country-year fixed effects also account for variations in demographic transitions across countries.

Model **B**. To allow for the effect of religion to vary by level of educational attainment, we also estimate the following model:

$$\mathcal{N}_i = \beta_2^B \mathcal{R}_i \times \mathcal{E}_i^f \times \mathcal{E}_i^m + \beta_3^B \mathcal{B}_i + \beta_4^B \mathcal{C}_i + \epsilon_i^B$$

where $\mathcal{R}_i \times \mathcal{E}_i^f \times \mathcal{E}_i^m$ stands for the level of education of the couple interacted with the woman's religion. This term stands for a vector of 7×25 categorical variables.

2.2 Estimation of the Parameters

2.2.1 Main Results

The results of the OLS regression of Model **A** are presented partially in Tables 3 and 4 and in full in Table A in the Appendix. They are robust to restricting the sample to women with children. All religions, except for Hinduism, significantly increase the number of children ever born (Table 3). The effect of religion is about three times higher for Protestants and Catholics than for Buddhists, in line with Lehrer (2004). The coefficients for Catholicism and Protestantism echo the results of Zhang (2008) who shows, for the US, "no significant fertility differences between fundamentalist Protestants, other Protestants, and Catholics. Catholics only show a significantly higher level of fertility when compared to other non-Christian religious people." Our ranking of Islam vs Hinduism is consistent with the results in Munshi and Myaux (2006) that Hindus maintain higher levels of contraceptive prevalence compared to Muslims (in rural Bangladesh). Finally, compared to Skirbekk et al. (2015) who look at Asian countries, we also find that Buddhism is less pro-natalist than the Abrahamic religions, but, unlike their findings, the coefficient for Buddhism is significant.

For easier interpretation, the estimated fertility for all 25 combined levels of education of a couple, drawn from the OLS regression of Model **A**, are presented in Table 4. The reference category is a woman with no religious affiliation in the Philippines born in 1945. The average number of children ever born for a non-educated couple with no religious affiliation is 4.25. Overall expected fertility declines with the couple's level of education. One interpretation is that the time spent on child care becomes more expensive when people are more productive. The higher value of time raises the cost of children and thereby reduces the demand for large families (Becker 1993). The average is 2.83 for a couple in which both spouses have a university degree. Interestingly though, among couples with low education, fertility is slightly higher for couples in which at least one of the spouses has received some primary education. This suggests that, for low levels of education, additional years of schooling translate into

	$\hat{\beta}_1^A$	s.e.
Buddhism	0.331 ^a	(0.0725)
Hinduism	0.218	(0.1127)
Islam	0.560 ^a	(0.0907)
Catholicism	0.914 ^a	(0.0461)
Protestantism	1.040 ^a	(0.0803)
Other religion	0.675 ^a	(0.1113)

Notes: Sample includes 561,948 observations. Column 1 represents coefficients for religion estimated with an OLS regression of model A; standard errors clustered by country in parentheses in column 2. All specifications also include dummy vectors for combined education levels of couples, birth years and censuses.

^a Significantly different from zero at 99 percent confidence level.

^b Significantly different from zero at 95 percent confidence level.

^c Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence level.

Table 3: Model A - Effect of religion on fertility

higher income, thus alleviating the cost of child-rearing and translating into higher fertility. For couples with an educational level higher than primary school, the opportunity cost of child-rearing compensates this effect however, causing fertility to decline with years of schooling.

We next turn to the OLS estimation of Model B where we regress fertility on the 25 education couples as well as education couples interacted with all religions, as well as census and birth year dummies. The full results are presented in Table A in the Appendix. In Table 5, we only present estimates for each educational level and for the marginal effect of being Catholic, Buddhist and Muslim at each educational level.

For individuals with no religious affiliation, fertility patterns across educational levels are similar to the ones estimated in Model A, with fertility declining even faster with the couple's education attainment. Allowing the impact of religion to vary across educational levels shows a more complex picture, with four main features. First, the marginal effect of Catholicism on fertility is stronger for couples with relatively high levels of education (completed primary or secondary), lowering the overall drop in fertility. A Catholic couple who completed primary education has on average 1.29 more children than a couple without religious affiliation (a difference of 33 percent in the number of children). Second, being a Catholic slows the decline in fertility especially for women whose education level is than their husbands. Catholicism has the strongest effect for women who completed primary education but whose husband did not and for women with a university degree whose husband have at most completed primary school. A Catholic woman born in 1945 with a university de-

\mathcal{E}_i^f	\mathcal{E}_i^m				
	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(v)
(i)	4.25 ^a	4.78 ^a	4.66 ^a	4.54 ^a	4.16 ^a
(ii)	4.90 ^a	4.82 ^a	4.70 ^a	4.33 ^a	3.77 ^a
(iii)	4.26 ^a	4.65 ^a	4.36 ^a	4.09 ^a	3.39 ^a
(iv)	4.23 ^a	3.89 ^a	3.52 ^a	3.42 ^a	3.12 ^a
(v)	4.32 ^a	3.28 ^a	2.99 ^a	2.75 ^a	2.83 ^a

Notes: Sample includes 561,948 observations. The matrix represents coefficients for couples' education levels estimated with an OLS regression of model A; standard errors clustered by country. Education levels of women \mathcal{E}_i^f in column, \mathcal{E}_i^m men in line. (i) indicates no education; (ii) some primary education; (iii) primary education completed; (iv) secondary education completed; (v) university completed. All specifications also include dummy vectors for religions, birth years and censuses. The reference category is a woman with no religious affiliation in the Philippines born in 1945.

^a Significantly different from zero at 99 percent confidence level.

^b Significantly different from zero at 95 percent confidence level.

^c Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence level.

Table 4: Model A - Effect of couple's education on fertility

gree has on average 1.45 (60 percent) more children than a woman without religion if their husband only has some primary education: this difference is only 1.01 (44 percent) more children if their husband also holds a university degree. Third, the main feature highlighted for Catholicism, which is that religion tends to dampen the decline in fertility due to education, is also true for Buddhism. However, there are slight differences with the patterns highlighted for the marginal effect of Catholicism at varying education levels. The marginal effects of Buddhism on fertility are overall lower in magnitude than the effects of Catholicism, in line with estimates from Model A (Table 4). Buddhism has the strongest positive impact on the fertility of couples with the highest levels of education (secondary schooling and above). A Buddhist woman in a couple in which both spouses hold a university degree has 1.44 more children than one without religious affiliation (62 percent more) while there is no significant difference between a Buddhist and a woman without religious affiliation in non-educated couples (with 5.58 children on average). Fourth, looking at Islam, we also find that educated couples are more affected by Islam than less educated couples. The conclusion that religious affiliation prevents fertility from going down as the parents' educational level rises is common to the three main religions present in the sample. Looking at some important cells like (iv) \times (iv), the effect is even stronger for Islam than for Catholicism.

\mathcal{E}_i^f	\mathcal{E}_i^m									
	(i)		(ii)		(iii)		(iv)		(v)	
(i)	5.58 ^a	[− 0.43 ^c] [− 0.30] [− 0.86 ^a]	5.71 ^a	[+ 0.36 ^c] [− 0.26 ^b] [− 0.44 ^b]	5.01 ^a	[+ 0.64 ^a] [+ 0.22 ^b] [+ 0.21]	3.83 ^a	[+ 1.34 ^a] [+ 0.79 ^a] [+ 1.80 ^a]	5.08 ^a	[− 2.54 ^a] [−0.65] [+ 0.63 ^a]
(ii)	4.92 ^a	[+ 0.90 ^a] [+ 0.49 ^b] [+ 0.50 ^b]	5.22 ^a	[+ 0.69 ^a] [− 0.15 ^c] [− 0.56 ^a]	4.72 ^a	[+ 1.06 ^a] [+ 0.03] [+ 1.13 ^a]	4.18 ^a	[+ 1.13 ^a] [+ 0.31 ^a] [+ 1.89 ^a]	3.67 ^a	[+ 0.88 ^a] [+ 0.42 ^c] [+ 1.39 ^a]
(iii)	3.78 ^a	[+ 1.56 ^a] [+ 0.82 ^b] [+ 1.23 ^a]	4.31 ^a	[+ 1.49 ^a] [+ 0.39 ^a] [+ 1.27 ^a]	4.01 ^a	[+ 1.29 ^a] [+ 0.37 ^b] [+ 1.81 ^a]	3.65 ^a	[+ 1.18 ^a] [+ 0.44 ^b] [+ 2.41 ^a]	3.13 ^a	[+ 0.89] [+ 0.75 ^a] [+ 1.26 ^a]
(iv)	5.08 ^a	[− 0.27] [− 0.84] [+ 1.01 ^b]	3.37 ^a	[+ 1.19 ^a] [+ 0.95 ^a] [+ 1.44 ^a]	3.22 ^a	[+ 1.13 ^a] [+ 0.73 ^a] [+ 1.88 ^a]	2.88 ^a	[+ 1.16 ^a] [+ 1.16 ^a] [+ 1.94 ^a]	2.58 ^a	[+ 1.21 ^a] [+ 1.20 ^a] [+ 1.62 ^a]
(v)	5.27 ^a	[−0.77 ^a] [+ 0.23 ^a]	2.40 ^a	[+ 1.45 ^a] [+ 1.32 ^a] [+ 4.43 ^a]	2.09 ^a	[+ 1.42 ^a] [+ 1.85 ^a] [+ 2.87 ^b]	2.43 ^a	[+ 0.99 ^a] [+ 1.24 ^a] [+ 0.68]	2.31 ^a	[+ 1.01 ^a] [+ 1.44 ^a] [+ 1.49 ^b]


Notes: Sample includes 561,948 observations. The matrix represents coefficients for couples' education levels estimated with an OLS regression of model B; standard errors clustered by country. Education levels of women \mathcal{E}_i^f in column, men \mathcal{E}_i^m in line. (i) indicates no education; (ii) some primary education; (iii) primary education completed; (iv) secondary education completed; (v) university completed. All specifications also include dummy vectors for religions, birth years and censuses. The reference category is a woman with no religious affiliation in the Philippines born in 1945. Coefficients in brackets represent the marginal effect of being a Catholic — Buddhist — Muslim.

^a Significantly different from zero at 99 percent confidence level.

^b Significantly different from zero at 95 percent confidence level.

^c Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence level.

Table 5: Model **B** - Average fertility by couple's education level (No religious affil. [Catholic] [Buddhist] [Muslim])



Notes: Histogram bars show the density distribution of the fertility variable. The line indicates a normal distribution.

Figure 2: Density Distribution of Fertility

Notice finally that, in Table 5, some coefficients are based on a very small number of observations.⁶ When estimating the structural parameters of the model we will develop in the next section, we are going to discard estimates based on less than 30 observations.⁷

We compute an F -statistic to test whether Model **B** provides a significantly better fit than Model **A** based on the following parameters: R^2 in Model **A** (resp. **B**) is equal to 75.41 (resp. 75.66), the number of regressors in Model **A** (resp. **B**) is 106 (resp. 282) and the residual sum of squares (RSS) in Model **A** (resp. **B**) is equal to 4778734 (resp. 4728709). The F -statistic is 2233 with a p -value of 0.00, leading to a rejection of the null hypothesis that Model **B** does not provide a significantly better fit than Model **A**.

⁶Note that our sample only counts 17 couples in which the woman has a university degree while her husband has no education and 113 couples in which the woman has no education while her husband has a university degree.

⁷Cells (i)×(iv), (i)×(v), (iv)×(i), and (v)×(i) for persons without religious affiliation, (i)×(v), (iv)×(i), and (v)×(i) for Catholics, (v)×(i), and (v)×(ii) for Buddhists, (iv)×(i), (v)×(ii), and (v)×(iii) for Muslims.

2.2.2 Additional Robustness

Our dependent variable, fertility, is a count variable, taking values between 0 and 29. Because the distribution of residuals is not normal, applying a linear regression model might lead to inefficient and inconsistent estimates (Long and Freese 2006), but allows us to directly interpret the results in terms of number of children. To assess the robustness of our main estimations, we first compare the distribution of our fertility variable with a normal distribution plot in Figure 2. Although slightly skewed to the left with a longer right tail, the fertility distribution is close to a normal density. Second, we estimate Models **A** and **B** with a Poisson regression. Results are presented in Table A in Appendix (Col. 2 and 4). The significance of coefficients is not affected by substituting Poisson to OLS estimations.

An additional concern is that the impact of religion (and of religion interacted with education) may vary between countries. Our estimation provides in fact an estimation of the average effect of religions on fertility in South-East Asia. To account for country specific effects of religions, one option would be to incorporate dummy variables interacting country and religion (and country, religion and education) but this puts too many constraints on the model and prevents us from estimating coefficients' standard errors. To nevertheless evaluate whether the estimation results are driven by a particular country, we estimate Models **A** and **B** with restricted samples. Tables B presents the results from these regressions. For easier comparison, columns (1) and (2) report results from the main OLS regressions using the full sample presented earlier (in Table A). The sample excludes the Philippines, mostly Catholic, in columns (3) and (4), and Thailand, predominantly Buddhist, in columns (5) and (6). Although the specification is identical to that described above, we do not report estimates of the educational categories, census and birth year coefficients for better readability. The results using the three different samples are very similar. Being a Catholic, as opposed to not having a religious affiliation, brings an additional 0.88 child on average when the Philippines or Thailand are excluded from the sample, compared to an additional 0.91 child on average with the full sample. The positive impact of being Hindu is significant in the models estimated with the restricted samples. Finally, the estimates of the marginal effect of religion at different levels of couple's education are very similar across all three samples.

Another potential limitation is that education might be endogenous to fertility due to teenage pregnancies. Restricting our sample to women aged more than 20 at the time of their first child's birth, instrumenting for age at menarche (Ribar 1994) or for miscarriage (Hotz, McElroy, and Sanders 2005) would allow us to rule out this argument, but these data are not available in the IPUMS data.

3 The Structural Model

We now estimate the structural parameters of an economic model with a quality-quantity tradeoff. We identify these parameters with an indirect inference method, using the fertility equation from Section 2 as the auxiliary model. The structural model we use is the one proposed by de la Croix and Doepke (2003), extended to allow for different sources of income and optimal degrees of involvement in child rearing from the father and the mother (inspired by Hazan, Leukhina, and Zoaby (2014)). It is a very parsimonious model which captures one key feature: the time cost of rearing many children being higher for more educated parents, they prefer having fewer children but investing more in their quality. A critical assumption of this model is that the most important cost of having children is a time cost rather than a good cost (see the estimation of Cordoba and Ripoll (2014) for the US).

As stated in the introduction, we view religion as exogenous and affecting the preferences, and hence the incentives, of the household. We will focus on four types of hypothetical households: Catholic, Buddhist, Muslims and without religious affiliation. These are the religions for which we have enough individuals in each educational cell to be confident in the estimation of Model **B** described above.

3.1 Households' Problem

Consider an economy populated by overlapping generations of individuals who live over three periods: childhood, adulthood, and old age. All decisions are made in the adult period of their life. Households care about adult consumption c_t , old-age consumption d_{t+1} , the number of their children n_t , and their quality (human capital) h_{t+1} . They have the same preferences and act cooperatively (unitary model of the household). Their utility function is given by:

$$\ln(c_t) + \sigma \ln(d_{t+1}) + \gamma \ln(n_t h_{t+1}^\eta). \quad (1)$$

The parameter $\sigma > 0$ is the psychological discount factor and $\gamma > 0$ is the weight of children in the utility function. Parameter $\eta \in (0, 1)$ is the weight of quality versus quantity of children for the household. The budget constraint for a couple with human capital (h_t^f, h_t^m) is:

$$c_t + s_t + e_t n_t h^T = \omega h_t^f (1 - a_t^f n_t) + h_t^m (1 - a_t^m n_t), \quad (2)$$

where the wage per unit of human capital is normalized to 1 for men and ω for women. a_t^f and a_t^m are the time spent by parents at childrearing. The total educational cost per child is given by $e_t h^T$, where e_t is the number of hours of teaching bought from a teacher with

human capital h^T . The assumption that education is purchased in the market but there is a minimum time cost required to bare children is common to de la Croix and Doepke (2003) and Moav (2005) and is key in explaining that highly educated parents will spend more on the quality of their children.

The technology that allows to produce children is given by:⁸

$$n_t = \frac{1}{\phi} \sqrt{a_t^f a_t^m}. \quad (3)$$

It stresses that time is essential to produce children, and that mother's and father's time are substitute. We do not introduce an *a priori* asymmetry between the parents. Asymmetry will arise as an equilibrium phenomenon: with the gender wage gap $\omega < 1$, it will be optimal to have the mother more specialized into childrearing. The parameter $\phi \in (0, 1)$ gives an upper bound to the number of children. If both parents devote their entire time to produce children, they will get $1/\phi$ of them.

The budget constraint for the old-age period is:

$$d_{t+1} = R_{t+1} s_t. \quad (4)$$

R_{t+1} is the interest factor. The human capital of the children h_{t+1} depends on education e_t :

$$h_{t+1} = \mu_t (\theta + e_t)^\xi. \quad (5)$$

The presence of $\theta > 0$ guarantees that parents have the option of not educating their children, because even with $e_t = 0$ future human capital remains positive. It can be interpreted as the level of public education provided to parents for free. Parameter ξ is the elasticity of human capital to education. It is to be understood as determining the rate of return of parental investment in education. Parents' influence on their children's human capital is limited to the effect through education spending. The specification of the efficiency parameter μ_t does not affect individual choices and is left to the next section.

The maximization problem can be decomposed into two steps. First, for some given number of children, parents allocate their time efficiently, that is they minimize the cost of childrearing:

$$\min_{a_t^f, a_t^m} (\omega h_t^f a_t^f + h_t^m a_t^m) n_t \quad \text{subject to } (3)$$

⁸Adapted from Browning, Chiappori, and Weiss (2014) p.265, and Gobbi (2014) to the production of quantity instead of quality.

This cost minimization problem leads to the following optimal rules (for $n < 1/\phi$):

$$\begin{aligned}
& \text{if } \frac{1}{\phi^2 n_t^2} > \frac{h_t^m}{\omega h_t^f} > \phi^2 n_t^2, & a_t^f &= \sqrt{\frac{h_t^m}{\omega h_t^f}} \phi n_t, & a_t^m &= \sqrt{\frac{\omega h_t^f}{h_t^m}} \phi n_t, \\
& \text{if } \frac{h_t^m}{\omega h_t^f} > \frac{1}{\phi^2 n_t^2}, & a_t^f &= 1, & a_t^m &= \phi^2 n_t^2, \\
& \text{if } \phi^2 n_t^2 > \frac{h_t^m}{\omega h_t^f}, & a_t^f &= \phi^2 n_t^2, & a_t^m &= 1.
\end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

Concentrating from now on the interior solution where both a_t^f and a_t^m are less than one, we see that the share of childrearing supported by the mother is inversely related to her human capital, weighted by the gender wage gap:

$$\frac{a_t^f}{a_t^f + a_t^m} = \frac{h_t^m}{h_t^m + \omega h_t^f}$$

Given the optimal a_t^f and a_t^m from (6), we can rewrite the income of the family as:

$$\omega h_t^f (1 - a_t^f n_t) + h_t^m (1 - a_t^m n_t) = h_t^m + \omega h_t^f - 2\phi \sqrt{\omega h_t^f h_t^m} n$$

The second step of the maximization problem allows us to characterize the quality-quantity tradeoff faced by individuals. A household has to choose a consumption profile c_t and d_{t+1} , saving for old age s_t , number of children n_t , and schooling time per child e_t . Equation (2) can be rewritten as

$$c_t + \frac{d_{t+1}}{R_{t+1}} + e_t n_t h^T + 2\phi \sqrt{\omega h_t^f h_t^m} n = \omega h_t^f + h_t^m. \tag{7}$$

where the left hand side represents the sum of consumption spending, education spending, and childrearing opportunity cost. The problem of the household is

$$\max_{c_t, d_{t+1}, n_t, e_t} (1) \text{ s.t. } (5), (7) \text{ and } e_t \geq 0$$

For a household with a sufficiently high human capital for the opportunity cost of an additional child to be large enough, i.e.

$$\omega h_t^f h_t^m > \left(\frac{\theta h^T}{2\phi \eta \xi} \right)^2,$$

there is an interior solution for the optimal education level. The first-order conditions imply:

$$s_t = \frac{\sigma}{1 + \sigma + \gamma} (\omega h_t^f + h_t^m), \quad (8)$$

$$e_t = \frac{2\phi\eta\zeta\sqrt{\omega h_t^f h_t^m} - \theta h^T}{(1 - \eta\zeta)h^T}, \quad (9)$$

$$n_t = \frac{(1 - \eta\zeta)\gamma(\omega h_t^f + h_t^m)}{1 + \sigma + \gamma} \frac{2\phi\sqrt{\omega h_t^f h_t^m} + \theta h^T}{4\phi^2\omega h_t^f h_t^m - \theta^2 h^{T^2}}. \quad (10)$$

For poorer households endowed with sufficiently little human capital, the optimal choice for education e_t is zero. The first-order conditions imply equation (8) and:

$$e_t = 0, \quad (11)$$

$$n_t = \frac{\gamma(\omega h_t^f + h_t^m)}{2(1 + \sigma + \gamma)\phi\sqrt{\omega h_t^f h_t^m}}. \quad (12)$$

Equations (9) and (10) reflect the quality-quantity tradeoff: when the opportunity cost of raising children $\phi\sqrt{\omega h_t^f h_t^m}$ increases, parents substitute education e_t for quantity n_t . There is strong empirical evidence that this mechanism is at work in developing countries (see e.g. the study on Chinese twins by Li, Zhang, and Zhu (2008) and the one by Klemp and Weisdorf (2012) on pre-industrial England). This substitution only happens in the interior regime.

We then use these equations to interpret the effect of religion on individual choices. We consider here that religion is exogenous and implies different preference parameters across denominations and compared to non religious people. We assume that religion neither influences the time cost parameter ϕ , the constant θ , nor the rate of return of education ζ . ϕ flows from a technological constraint. θ represents the provision of education good (possibly public) imposed to the parents. ζ depends on the labor market of each country. We focus on the three parameters which depend most likely on religious values.

If a religion increases the preference for children γ , it leads to more children, the same level of education per child, and less saving. This holds both in the interior regime (8)-(9)-(10) and in the corner regime (8)-(11)-(12). It may thus depress growth through physical capital accumulation but not through human capital accumulation. We will call this religion **pro-child** as it promotes both quantity and quality.

If a religion decreases the relative weight of quality over quantity η , it has no effect in the corner regime (8)-(11)-(12). In the interior regime (8)-(9)-(10), it leads to more children, less

education, and the same level of saving. It may therefore depress growth through human capital accumulation. Such a religion is said to be **pro-birth**.

The two qualifications we introduced, pro-child and pro-birth, describe how households that increase the share of children in total spending actually spend that income. Coming back to the budget constraint (7), the total spending on children can be decomposed into spending on quality and spending on quantity:

$$\frac{e_t n_t h^T + 2\phi \sqrt{\omega h_t^f h_t^m} n}{\omega h_t^f + h_t^m} = \frac{e_t n_t h^T}{\omega h_t^f + h_t^m} + \frac{2\phi \sqrt{\omega h_t^f h_t^m} n}{\omega h_t^f + h_t^m}$$

Using the first order conditions in the interior regime, we can see how these two spending shares are directly expressed in terms of the parameters γ and η when θ is small:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{e_t n_t h^T}{\omega h_t^f + h_t^m} &= \frac{\gamma \eta \xi}{1 + \gamma + \sigma} \text{ for } \theta = 0 \\ \frac{2\phi \sqrt{\omega h_t^f h_t^m} n}{\omega h_t^f + h_t^m} &= \frac{\gamma(1 - \eta \xi)}{1 + \gamma + \sigma} \text{ for } \theta = 0 \end{aligned}$$

Hence a pro-child religion (high γ) leads to more spending of the two types, while a pro-birth religion (low η) redirects spending from quality towards quantity.⁹

3.2 Identification

One period is assumed to be 30 years. Some parameters are set a priori, based on commonly accepted values, supposed common to all countries. The biological time cost of raising children is $\phi = 0.065$, implying a maximum number of children of $1/\phi \approx 15$. The discount factor σ is set at 1% per quarter, i.e. $\sigma = 0.99^{120} = 0.3$. The rate of return on education spending ξ is set to $1/3$. As we can see from the first order conditions, it cannot be identified separately from η , hence it can be seen as a scaling factor on η . Parameter ξ is related to the Mincerian rate of return ϱ (defined by $h_{t+1} = \exp(\varrho \times \text{years of education})$) through the following relation:

$$\varrho = \frac{d \ln h_{t+1}}{de} \frac{de}{d(\text{years of education})}$$

⁹The logarithmic utility is essential in getting these simple expressions. Assuming a more general utility with an elasticity of substitution between goods different from unity would lead to more complicated expressions, with spending shares depending on the shadow prices of quantity and quality of children.

where $de/d(\text{years of education})$ represents the increase in educational spending needed to increase years of education by one. Assuming as in de la Croix and Doepke (2003) that an additional year of schooling raises educational expenditure by 20 percent, and using the first order condition for e in the interior regime, we get

$$\varrho = \frac{\xi}{\theta + e} 0.2 e$$

which leads to $\varrho = 0.066$ for θ negligible. A Mincerian return of 6.6% seems a reasonably conservative estimate for emerging countries.

In order to compute the fertility of the 25 types of couples in Table 1, we need to map educational levels into earnings levels. As we take the Philippines as a benchmark, we use the study of Luo and Terada (2009) who estimate the earnings of men and women of different educational categories. They find that the gender wage gap for low educational levels is $\omega = 0.75$. Table 6 gives the human capital level for all educational categories. The effective income of women is given by ωh^f .

	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(v)
h^f	1	1.035	1.07	1.46	2.14
h^m	1	1.065	1.13	1.37	1.86

Notes: Estimations from Luo and Terada (2009). (i) indicates no education; (ii) some primary education; (iii) primary education completed; (iv) secondary education completed; (v) university completed. Results normalized to 1 for category (i).

Table 6: Income by Education Categories in the Philippines

The Mincerian rate of return implicit in Table 6 depends on how we count the years of primary education. Including years of primary leads to low estimates of ϱ . For example, for women,¹⁰ assuming that one needs 16 years to complete university, we have $2.14 = \exp(\varrho 16)$, leading to $\varrho = 4.7\%$. Computing the rate of return once primary education is completed leads to higher estimates: $2.14/1.07 = \exp(\varrho(16 - 6))$, i.e. $\varrho = 6.9\%$.

We set the human capital of the teacher h^T equal to the human capital of a woman with secondary education (without gender gap in the education sector). This implies that education is relatively costly for someone with a low educational level, but cheap for someone with a university degree.

¹⁰Notice that, in the theory, we have abstracted from different rates of return for boys and girls. If ξ was different across genders, it would be optimal to differentiate the education of boys and girls, investing more in the human capital with the highest return. One would then need to consider fertility as a sequential choice, where the total number of children would depend on whether parents had boys or girls in the first place. See Hazan and Zoabi (2015).

There remains three parameters to identify: θ , γ , and η . To verify that these parameters can be identified through the fertility pattern described in Equations (10)-(12), we draw the shift in the fertility function implied by a change in each of the parameters. Figure 3 reports the results, with, in the left column, fertility as a function of the human capital of a mother married to a man with no education, and, in the right column, fertility as a function of the human capital of a father married to a woman with no education. The left panel of each figure depicts the corner regime with no education (above the exogenous level θ). Entering the interior regime, fertility drops as the quality - quantity tradeoff kicks in. As parents' education increases, spending on quality (education) substitutes to spending on quantity.

From the top panels, we observe that θ is key to determining the point where the regime shifts. Increasing θ makes the corner regime more present. The preference for children γ acts as a shift on the whole pattern, affecting fertility in the corner regime and in the interior regime the same way. Like θ , the parameter η acts on the point where the regime shifts. But, unlike θ , it also affects the speed at which fertility declines as the education of the parents rises.

We conclude that each parameter has a unique role in determining how fertility varies across household types. We can now identify them to reproduce the characteristics of the auxiliary models **A** and **B**. Although Model **A** is slightly inferior in terms of fit, we investigate whether relying on Model **B** instead of **A** matters for the structural analysis. Introducing the index z for religion, we focus on households with $z \in \{\text{no religious affil., Catholics, Buddhists, Muslims}\}$. We assume that θ does not depend on religion, while η_z and γ_z do.

To identify the 9 deep parameters, we use a minimum distance estimation procedure that matches, for each religion, the 5×5 matrix of the empirical moments from the data with the matrix of moments implied by the model for a given choice of parameters. Formally, given some weights $p_{i,j,z}$, the minimum distance estimator is obtained from

$$\min_{\theta, \gamma_z, \eta_z} \sum_z \sum_{i,j} p_{i,j,z} (\hat{\mathcal{N}}_{i,j,z} - n^*[\theta, \gamma_z, \eta_z, h^f(i), h^m(j)])^2. \quad (13)$$

The empirical moments $\hat{\mathcal{N}}_{i,j,z}$ are drawn from the distribution of the coefficients of the education dummies in Table 4 for Model **A** and in Table 5 for Model **B**. $n^*[\theta, \gamma_z, \eta_z, h^f(i), h^m(j)]$ denotes the theoretical fertility of a couple with human capital $h^f(i), h^m(j)$, where i and j are the education categories, and z its religious affiliation.

The weights $p_{i,j,z}$ are equal to one when there is at least 30 observations from which the




Figure 3: Comparative Static of the Fertility Pattern

	Model A				Model B			
	No relig.	Catholic	Buddhist	Muslim	No relig.	Catholic	Buddhist	Muslim
θ		0.050 (0.0036)				0.055 (0.0012)		
γ_z	0.555 (0.0244)	0.715 (0.0264)	0.693 (0.0326)	0.608 (0.0276)	0.674 (0.0378)	0.746 (0.0152)	0.621 (0.0737)	0.704 (0.0092)
η_z	1.816 (0.0858)	1.757 (0.0879)	1.768 (0.0931)	1.757 (0.0905)	2.114 (0.0519)	1.943 (0.0309)	1.872 (0.0555)	1.751 (0.0552)

Notes: mean (st. dev.) of structural parameters minimizing Function (13), for 200 draws of the fertility matrices $\hat{\mathcal{N}}_{i,j,z}$.

Table 7: Deep Parameters




Figure 4: Pro-birth and Pro-child Religions

moment $\hat{\mathcal{N}}_{i,j,z}$ is computed, and zero otherwise.¹¹ Results are shown in Table 7. Parameters mean and standard deviation are computed by drawing 200 matrices $\hat{\mathcal{N}}_{i,j}$ from the distribution of the parameters of the auxiliary model, which provide 200 estimations of the deep parameters.

From this table, it appears that Catholicism is pro-child ($\Delta^+ \gamma$), and particularly when one uses Model **B** instead of Model **A**. Buddhism is very much like non religious affiliation in Model **A**, but slightly pro-birth ($\Delta^- \eta$) when one uses Model **B**. Islam is clearly pro-birth in the two models. Using the auxiliary model **B**, all religions are in fact biased against the quality of children (lower η), but less so for Catholicism and Buddhism compared to Islam. This estimation shows how crucial it is to account for interaction effects between religion and education in the auxiliary model. For example, if these effects are neglected, the pro-child effect of Catholicism (rise in γ) is overestimated and its pro-birth effect (drop in η) underestimated. We also miss the very strong effect on η of Buddhism and Islam.

Figure 4 summarizes the result by showing the allocation of spending on children by religious denominations. Remember that $\gamma\eta\tilde{\xi}/(1 + \sigma + \gamma)$ is closely tight to the share of income spent on quality, while $\gamma(1 - \eta\tilde{\xi})/(1 + \sigma + \gamma)$ is related to the spending on quantity. Those are the two dimensions plotted on the graph. The line with a negative slope is an iso- γ line. Moving to the North-East means that γ increases, and so does total spending on children and the pro-child character of the considered religion. Moving to the North-West means that η decreases for a given γ and the considered religion is more pro-birth, directing spending towards quantity.

For each religion, we plot the estimated deep parameters for 200 draws of the parameters of the auxiliary model. This gives a sense of the uncertainty surrounding the estimates. We also plot as a circle the mean estimation.

4 Counter-Factual Experiments on Religion and Growth

We now embed the model of the household described above in a simple growth model. The objective is to infer some dynamic and long-run implications for growth, fertility and education. We however refrain from any statement on welfare effects, as it would involve comparing individuals with different preferences (induced by religion). We first develop

¹¹An alternative would be to use the inverse of the variance of the estimated coefficients, which puts less weight on the coefficients that are less precisely estimated. This optimal weighting matrix is however very rarely used in practice, given the heavy computational burden it imposes. An alternative often found in the literature is to use $p_{i,j,z} = \hat{\mathcal{N}}_{i,j,z}^2$, which minimizes the deviations in percentage terms. Using these weights does not change our results, as our moments have all the same order of magnitude.

the model, then simulate the path of hypothetical countries populated by homogeneous religious groups to understand the specificities of each of them, and finally simulate growth of real countries with the right mix of religions.

4.1 Theory

To simplify, and to abstract from any role played by inequality, we consider the case of an economy composed of individuals with the same human capital $h_t = h_t^m = h_t^f$ and of teachers with human capital h^T , whose demographic weight in the population is negligible.¹² The efficiency parameter μ_t in the human capital accumulation equation (5) is assumed to follow

$$\mu_t = \mu \hat{h}_t^\kappa (1 + \rho)^{(1-\kappa)t}, \quad (14)$$

where human capital \hat{h}_t is a geometric average of the human capital of the parents and of the teacher:

$$\hat{h}_t = h_t^\tau h^{T^{1-\tau}}.$$

The parameter τ captures the intergenerational transmission of ability and human capital formation within the family that do not work through formal schooling. Empirical studies detect such effects, but they are relatively small.

As in Rangazas (2000), Equation 14 is compatible with endogenous growth for $\kappa = 1$, and with exogenous growth otherwise.

- When $\kappa = 1$, μ_t depends linearly on aggregate human capital. This is the simplest way of modelling a human capital externality driving the growth process. The empirical evidence supporting that education is one of the key determinants of growth is strong, both in terms of quantity of education (Cohen and Soto 2007) and quality of education (Hanushek and Woessmann 2012). This is a case in which a change in parameters driving human capital accumulation will have the strongest effect on income per person, as the growth rate itself will be modified. It therefore gives an upper bound on the pro-child effect on growth.
- On the contrary, when $\kappa < 1$, growth is exogenous, and change in parameters will only lead to differences in the levels of income per person. Parameter κ could be interpreted as a measure of human capital externalities. Existing evidence (see Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) and Krueger and Lindahl (2001)) suggests that these externalities are

¹²When there are no idiosyncratic ability shocks, the model of de la Croix and Doepke (2003) converges to a situation where inequality vanishes asymptotically.

small, i.e., the social return on human capital accumulation is only slightly larger than the private return. The standard model of exogenous growth is obtained when $\kappa = 0$.

Production of the final good is carried out by a single representative firm which operates the technology:

$$Y_t = AK_t^\varepsilon L_t^{1-\varepsilon},$$

where K_t is aggregate capital, L_t is aggregate labor input in efficiency units, $A > 0$ and $\varepsilon \in (0, 1)$. Physical capital completely depreciates in one period. The firm chooses inputs by maximizing profits $Y_t - w_t L_t - R_t K_t$. As a consequence, factor prices are

$$w_t = (1 - \varepsilon)AK_t^\varepsilon L_t^{-\varepsilon}, \quad \text{and} \quad R_t = \varepsilon AK_t^{\varepsilon-1} L_t^{1-\varepsilon}.$$

Adult population, measured by the number of couple P_{t+1} , is given by:

$$P_{t+1} = P_t(n_t/2), \tag{15}$$

The market-clearing conditions for capital is:

$$K_{t+1} = P_t s_t, \tag{16}$$

Time spent at rearing children follows:

$$a_t^f = \phi n / \sqrt{\omega}, \quad a_t^m = \phi n \sqrt{\omega},$$

The market-clearing conditions for labor is:

$$L_t = [\omega h_t(1 - \phi n / \sqrt{\omega}) + h_t(1 - \phi n \sqrt{\omega}) - e_t n_t h^T] P_t. \tag{17}$$

This last condition reflects the fact that the time devoted to teaching is not available for goods production.

When human capital of the population h_t is very small compared to the one of the teachers h^T , the economy is in a corner regime with $e_t = 0$ and n_t given by Equation (12). In that case, the parameter η plays no role (except is the condition which should be satisfied for this corner case to hold). The economy is then like a Solow model, where there is exogenous technical progress (or exogenous human capital accumulation with $\kappa = 1$) driving growth, and where physical capital accumulation is the key driver of dynamics.

Proposition 1 *In the corner regime, a pro-child religion ($\Delta^+ \gamma$) has a negative effect on income per capita. A pro-birth religion ($\Delta^- \eta$) has no effect beyond making the corner regime more likely.*

The negative effect of increased γ on income goes through increased fertility, lower labor supply L_t , and lower capital per person (as in the usual Solow model).

Many authors see the development process as initially driven by physical capital accumulation. Later on, “the process of industrialization was characterized by a gradual increase in the relative importance of human capital for the production process.” (see Galor and Moav (2006)). In our simple set-up, this correspond to crossing the threshold $x_t > \frac{\theta h^T}{\phi \eta \xi}$. In the interior regime, human capital is endogenous as $e_t > 0$. The economy converges¹³ toward a balanced growth path which is characterized by the following proposition:

Proposition 2 *If*

$$2\eta\phi\xi\sqrt{\omega} > \theta \quad (18)$$

the long-run growth factor of gdp per capita is:

$$g = \mu \left(\theta + \frac{2\eta\phi\xi\sqrt{\omega} - \theta}{1 - \eta\xi} \right)$$

if $\kappa = 1$, and $g = 1 + \rho$ otherwise.

Proof: Condition (18) ensures that the interior regime prevails in the long-run. Then, Equations (5), (9), and (14) imply the value of g in the proposition. ■

From the value of the growth rate g , we directly infer the following.

Corollary 1 *A pro-child religion ($\Delta^+\gamma$) has no effect on long-run growth. A pro-birth religion ($\Delta^-\eta$) permanently affects the long-run growth rate in the endogenous growth case ($\kappa = 1$).*

Long-run variables in levels can be defined as:

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{e} &= e_t = \frac{2\eta\phi\xi\sqrt{\omega} - \theta}{1 - \eta\xi}, \\ \hat{n} &= n_t = \frac{(1 - \eta\xi)\gamma(1 + \omega)}{1 + \sigma + \gamma} \frac{2\phi\sqrt{\omega} + \theta}{4\phi^2\omega - \theta^2}, \\ \hat{h} &= \frac{h_t}{g^t} = (\mu(\theta + \hat{e})/g)^{\frac{1}{1-\kappa}}, \end{aligned}$$

¹³Provided that some stability condition is met. $\xi\eta + \tau < 1$ suffices. See de la Croix and Doepke (2003).

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{s} &= \frac{s_t}{g^t} = \frac{\sigma}{1 + \sigma + \gamma}(\omega + 1)\hat{h}, \\
\hat{\ell} &= \frac{L_t}{P_t g^t} = [\omega(1 - \phi\hat{n}/\sqrt{\omega}) + (1 - \phi\hat{n}\sqrt{\omega}) - \hat{e}\hat{n}] \hat{h}, \\
\hat{k} &= \frac{K_t}{P_t(g)^t} = \frac{2\hat{s}}{g\hat{n}}, \\
\hat{y} &= \frac{Y_t}{P_t(g)^t} = A\hat{k}^\varepsilon \hat{\ell}^{1-\varepsilon}.
\end{aligned}$$

Computing how γ and η affect the above system, we infer that:

Proposition 3 *When growth is exogenous ($\kappa < 1$):*

A pro-child religion ($\Delta^+\gamma$) lowers the long run income per person \hat{y}_t through physical capital accumulation \hat{k} . A pro-birth religion ($\Delta^-\eta$) lowers the long run income per person \hat{y}_t through human capital accumulation \hat{h} .

4.2 Calibration and simulation of religion specific effects

In order to simulate the effect of religious composition on growth, we retain the individual-specific parameters identified in the previous section from Model **B**. In addition, we need calibrate the macroeconomic parameters τ , κ , ρ , ε , μ , and A . In line with the literature, these parameters are chosen so as to match a hypothetical balanced growth path similar to the one achieved by developed countries in the post-war period (see e.g. Lagerlöf (2006)). τ is set to 0.1, in line with the evidence in Leibowitz (1974) who finds that even after controlling for parents' schooling and education, a 10-percent increase in parental income increases a child's future earnings by up to 0.85 percent. κ will be either 0 or 1, depending on the assumed model (exogenous vs endogenous growth). ρ is set so as to have a growth rate of income per capita of 2 percent per year in the exogenous growth model. The share of capital in added value is set to its usual value $\varepsilon = 1/3$. We calibrate the constant μ so as to reproduce a long-run growth rate g of 2 percent per year in a country whose entire population is without religious affiliation. Using the value of the growth rate along the BGP it leads to $\mu = 3.46$ with $\kappa = 1$ and $\mu = 1.91$ with $\kappa = 0$. As a normalization we set the value of the scale parameter A in the production function to obtain a wage equal to 1 in the long-run. It yields $A = 3.4$.

We first consider the endogenous growth version of the model, that will give us an upper bound on the long-run effect of religions on growth and income levels. We accordingly set $\kappa = 1$ and simulate a dynamic path for a hypothetical economy composed of individuals with no religious affiliation. Initial conditions are such that $h^T = 1$, $h_t = 0.3$, and capital is

such that the capital labor ratio takes its steady state value. Starting from the same initial conditions, we do the same for a hypothetical economy composed of Catholics, Buddhists, and Muslims. Key macroeconomic variables after one period ($t = 1$) and six periods ($t = 6$) are presented in Table 8.

		No religious affil.	Catholics	Buddhists	Muslims
$t = 1$	n_t	5.31	5.67	5.03	5.46
	$\theta + e_t$ (% gdp)	4.26%	4.49%	4.08%	4.35%
	$s_t / ((1 + \omega)h_t w_t)$	15.17%	14.64%	15.59%	15.03%
	$L_t / (P_t h_t)$	1.15	1.11	1.18	1.13
	y_t	1.28	1.22	1.34	1.25
	annual growth	3.06%	2.97%	3.15%	3.02%
$t = 6$	n_t	3.93	4.40	4.04	4.69
	$\theta + e_t$ (% gdp)	8.91%	8.68%	6.42%	5.44%
	$s_t / ((1 + \omega)h_t w_t)$	15.17%	14.64%	15.59%	15.03%
	$L_t / (P_t h_t)$	1.15	1.11	1.18	1.13
	y_t	39.87	23.77	22.54	15.38
	annual growth	2.24%	1.85%	1.71%	1.48%

Table 8: Macroeconomic variables after 1 and 6 periods - $\kappa = 1$

In period 1, fertility is high everywhere, but more so in the Catholic economy, followed by the Muslim and the Buddhist economies. Households' educational spending e_t are zero. Considering θ as exogenous (possibly public) educational spending, the share of these spending in GDP is around 4 percent. Saving over maximum income is around 15 percent. The lowest saving rate is seen in the Catholic country, as it is the most pro-child religion (high γ). Labor supply is also lower in this economy, as having children takes time. The level of income per person, y_t , is expected to be smaller in the Catholic country for these two reasons: lower saving, and lower labor supply. The simulation shows that the effect is however quite small quantitatively.

In period 6, all economies are now in the interior regime, and endogenous human capital drives growth. Fertility has fallen compared to period 1, and is now higher in the Muslim country. This reversal in the ranking of fertility arises because the pro-birth character of the religions now matters in the interior regime, and Islam is estimated to be the most pro-birth one (lower η). The ranking of the parameter η is reflected in the share of education spending in GDP, which ranges from 8.9 in the country with no religious affiliation to 5.4 in the Muslim country. Saving rate is the same as in period 1 (this is a consequence of the logarithmic utility function), while labor supply does not change much. The gap in GDP is now wider,

as it results from accumulated discrepancies. The Catholic and Buddhist country now have an income equal to slightly more than one half of that of the country without religious affiliation. Income in the Muslim country is one third of the country without religion. In terms of growth rate, the pro-birth character of the various religions lead them to lose from 0.4 to 0.8 percentage points of growth per year. Remember, with $\kappa = 1$, we obtain an upper bound on those effects.

		No religious affil.	Catholics	Buddhists	Muslims
$t = 1 (e_t = 0)$	n_t	4.62	5.07	5.56	5.1
	y_t	0.95	0.89	0.98	0.92
	annual growth	2.03%	1.91%	2.09%	1.95%
$t = 6 (e_t > 0)$	n_t	3.16	4.01	3.77	4.49
	y_t	29.21	23.74	25.52	21.56
	annual growth	2.22%	2.13%	2.11%	2.07%

Table 9: Macroeconomic variables after 1 and 6 periods - $\kappa = 0$

Let us now consider the exogenous growth version of the model. Key macroeconomic variables are presented in Table 9. Educational spending, labor supply and saving are not reported but are similar to those of the previous tables. The major difference from the previous tables is the magnitude of the income and growth differences after 6 periods. The growth “penalty” of religion is reduced to 0.1 percentage point of annual growth, and the differences in the level of income drop to around 25 percent.

4.3 Uncertainty Surrounding the Effect of Religion on GDP per Capita

The results of the previous subsection are computed given the estimated values for the structural parameters. Since those parameters are uncertain, we show here how this uncertainty translates into uncertainty surrounding the effect of religion affiliation on the GDP per capita y of hypothetical economies populated by citizens with the same religion. Practically, we draw 200 fertility matrices $\hat{\mathcal{N}}_{i,j,z}$ from their empirical distribution. For each draw, we estimate the structural parameters θ , η_z , and γ_z . We then calibrate the parameters μ and A as explained above, and run a dynamic simulation. The procedure gives us 200 tables like Table 8. Let us concentrate on the GDP per capita y after 6 periods ($t = 6$). Figure 5 shows the 95% confidence interval for the four religious denominations and the two growth models. Uncertainty is larger in the endogenous growth version, as the deep parameters determine the growth rate of income, and the uncertainty affecting them cumulates over time.

The result according to which income is larger in the country without religious affiliation than income in the Catholic country, which is itself larger than income in the Muslim country, appears as significant in both growth models. Concerning the Buddhist country, the uncertainty is large. Nothing significant can be concluded in the endogenous growth model, but the Buddhist country dominates the Muslim country significantly in the exogenous growth model.




Figure 5: GDP per cap. in the Hypothetical Economies after 6 Periods: Confidence Intervals

4.4 Implications for Countries' Growth

Let us now draw some implications from these results for actual countries. Table 10 shows the actual growth rates of income per capita for the six South-East Asian countries, and for the two models considered. Assuming for simplicity that markets within each country are segmented by religion, the countries' economies are weighted averages of artificial economies with religion specific effects.¹⁴ For example, the Philippines are approximated by a composite country made of 88 percent of Catholics, 11 percent of Buddhists and 1 percent of people without religious affiliation. Thailand is 95 percent Buddhist, 4 percent Muslim,

¹⁴A model economy with heterogeneous households of different religions would deliver very similar results because of constant returns to scale and homothetic preferences.

and 1 percent Catholic. Muslims countries are Indonesia (87 percent Muslim) and Malaysia (54 percent Muslim).

In the model economies, everything other than religious composition is the same across them: inequality, initial condition, etc. The country fixed effect on fertility is also set at that of the Philippines. The gap between the two growth rates of any two pair of model countries measures the pure effect of religious composition.

	countries' growth rates						growth gaps			
	Cam	Ind	Mal	Phi	Vie	Tha	Vie-Ind	Tha-Phi	Ind-Phi	Tha-Ind
<i>data</i>										
1950-80	1.82	2.85	2.88	2.69	0.47	3.87	-2.38	1.18	0.15	1.02
1980-2010	3.68	3.09	3.44	0.81	4.94	4.43	1.85	3.62	2.28	1.34
<i>endogenous growth</i>										
t=1	3.15	3.02	3.06	2.97	3.07	3.14	0.04	0.17	0.05	0.12
t=2	2.29	2.16	2.19	2.29	2.51	2.29	0.34	0.00	-0.12	0.12
t=3	1.93	1.78	1.81	2.00	2.25	1.93	0.47	-0.07	-0.22	0.15
t=6	1.71	1.58	1.60	1.83	2.19	1.71	0.61	-0.12	-0.25	0.12
<i>exogenous growth</i>										
t=1	2.09	1.96	1.99	1.92	2.03	2.08	0.08	0.16	0.04	0.13
t=2	2.25	2.17	2.19	2.22	2.31	2.25	0.14	0.03	-0.05	0.09
t=3	2.25	2.19	2.20	2.26	2.36	2.25	0.17	-0.01	-0.08	0.06
t=6	2.11	2.08	2.09	2.13	2.20	2.11	0.12	-0.02	-0.04	0.02
Notes: Cam: Cambodia, Ind: Indonesia, Mal: Malaysia, Phi: Philippines, Vie:Vietnam, Thai: Thailand. Data are Maddison (2010)'s data, updated by Bolt and van Zanden (2013).										

Table 10: Growth rates in the data and in the models

Let us first consider the period 1950-1980, which we make correspond to period 1 in the model, a period where education was low and growth driven by capital accumulation. Abstracting from Cambodia and Vietnam which were devastated by war over that period, the model gets the ranking right for the period 1950-1980: the fastest growing country was Thailand, followed by Malaysia and Indonesia, then by the Philippines. The gap between Thailand and the Philippines is of 1.18 percent per year, while it is equal to 0.17 percent in the endogenous growth model (0.16 percent in the exogenous growth model). Hence, religion alone explains a little more than 10 percent of the growth gap between Thailand and the Philippines over 1950-1980. The gap between Indonesia and the Philippines was 0.15 percent per year. Differences in religion explain one third of this gap with the endogenous growth model, and a little less with the exogenous growth model. In sum, religion depresses growth in early stages by lowering saving, physical capital, and labor supply. These

effects account for 10 percent to 50 percent of the actual growth gaps between countries over the period 1950-1980.

Looking at the more recent period, 1980-2010, both models explain well the predominance of non religious Vietnam over its neighbors. Religion alone explains one fifth of the gap between Vietnam and Indonesia (comparing 1980-2010 with $t=2$ in the endogenous growth model). It also explains that Buddhist countries, Cambodia and Thailand, do better than Muslim countries. Religion explains 13 percent of the gap between Thailand and Indonesia, for example. There is however one feature of the data we cannot explain by religion. In the endogenous growth model, the Philippines should do well because catholics are relatively pro-child, and education is not neglected. This is obviously not the case in the data.¹⁵ In sum, at later stages of growth, pro-birth religions lower the growth and human capital accumulation, explaining between 10 percent and 20 percent of the gap between Muslim and Buddhist countries of South-East Asia over the period 1980-2010. The low performance of the Philippines remains however unexplained.

An interesting implication we can draw for actual countries is inferred from the artificial period 6. Here the two countries with a large Muslim population, Indonesia and Malaysia, are expected to suffer from a lack of investment in human capital. According to the endogenous human capital model, Indonesia (87 percent Muslim) and Malaysia (54 percent Muslim) would grow at 1.58 percent and 1.60 percent respectively, while the Philippines and Thailand would grow at 1.83 percent and 1.71 percent respectively.

Two remarks are in order before we conclude. First, the use of an endogenous growth model where human capital is the engine of growth is quite in accordance with the recent empirical literature on education and growth but obviously leads to strong macroeconomic effects of the quality-quantity tradeoff at play. If endogenous growth were driven by capital accumulation instead, such as in the AK model, the religion that discourages saving the most would have had the most dramatic effects. Second, our estimated effects rely upon the fertility behavior of women in South-Asia born between 1900 and 1963. During that time, one might think that there was a strong link between religious teaching and behavior. Using those results to make forecast future trends would be farfetched, as this link may get looser with the rise of secularization.

¹⁵In his famous article, Lucas (1993) already stressed that the Philippines and South Korea started from similar initial conditions in 1950, but ended up growing at very different rates.

5 Conclusion

Most religions have a tendency to increase the share of income that their members spend on children by their members. The way they do this, however, has an impact on a country's overall growth process. In particular, religions may or may not damage long-run growth, depending on whether they only encourage members to have more children (pro-birth religion) or they encourage members to both have more children and to educate them better (pro-child religion).

Viewing South-East Asia as a microcosm gathering most world religions, we have first pooled the censuses of the countries for which religious affiliation is available, together with data on completed fertility and education. We show that, among all religions present in South-East Asia, Catholicism is on average the one that appears the most pro-natalist (+0.91 child, controlling for parents' education). Protestants do not seem to differ from Catholics. Buddhists and Muslims also have higher fertility compared to people with no religious denomination (+0.33 and +0.56 child respectively).

Second, taking advantage of the large number of observations for each religion, we have identified the effects described above by interacting religion and education variables. We show that the effect of religion on fertility is not uniformly distributed across education categories. Whether or not they have a religious denomination does not matter as much for less educated couples, who display high fertility rates anyway. For middle and highly educated couples, however, fertility remains high for religious couples. This effect holds for Catholics, Protestants and Buddhists, and is particularly strong for Muslims.

Third, interpreting this fertility-education relationship with Becker's theory of fertility, we relate the speed at which fertility declines when parents' education rises to the willingness of the parents to substitute child quantity for child quality. A pro-child religion increases fertility for all couples, irrespective of their level of education. A pro-birth religion essentially increases the fertility of the parents who would otherwise substitute quality (education) for quantity, i.e. parents with relatively high education levels, and high opportunity cost of child rearing. Measuring by indirect inference parents' preferences such as those revealed by the empirical relationship between their education and fertility, we conclude that the three main religions are both pro-birth (emphasizing quantity over quality) and pro-child (increasing spending on children). Catholicism and Buddhism are surprisingly similar in the bias they generate, with Catholicism being slightly more pro-child. Islam appears more pro-birth than the two others.

Fourth, we highlight that these characteristics have consequences for growth, which depend

on the stage of the growth process, by mapping the microeconomic estimates into an endogenous growth model. At the early stages of growth, the main driver of growth is physical capital accumulation. In that context, the bias against the quality of children does not matter; all that matters is the amount of resources devoted to saving and accumulation. Having many children diverts resources from growth. Our model predicts that Catholic countries should grow at a slower pace than other countries, as the pro-child bias is the strongest in Catholic households. At later stages of growth, human capital accumulation becomes key, and the pro-birth bias of religion becomes detrimental to the growth process. Muslim countries are expected to suffer more, while countries with many people without religious denominations are expected to grow faster. The size of this effect is not small, with a penalty of 0.6 percentage points for Muslim countries and 0.4 for Catholic and Buddhist countries per years being an upper bound.

All these results are derived from the behavior of married women born between 1900 and 1963. With the general decline of attitudes toward religion and the rise of secularization, it is likely that the gap we have identified may shrink in the future.

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A Regression Results

	Model A			Model B		
	OLS (1)		Poisson (2)	OLS (3)		Poisson (4)
	coef	(se)	coef	(se)	coef	(se)
<i>Religion</i>						
Buddhist	0.3308***	(0.0725)	0.0742***	(0.0144)		
Hindu	0.2185	(0.1127)	0.0598***	(0.0207)		
Muslim	0.5599***	(0.0907)	0.1219***	(0.0193)		
Catholic	0.9142***	(0.0461)	0.1897***	(0.0101)		
Protestant	1.0403***	(0.0803)	0.2056***	(0.0120)		
Other	0.6753***	(0.1113)	0.1397***	(0.0264)		
<i>Couple's Education</i>						
No-F No-M	4.2474***	(0.3784)	1.4721***	(0.0778)	5.5837***	(0.1935)
No-F SomePrim-M	4.7801***	(0.3193)	1.5671***	(0.0680)	5.7058***	(0.0755)
No-F PrimComp-M	4.6574***	(0.3049)	1.5451***	(0.0625)	5.0114***	(0.0358)
No-F Sec-M	4.5354***	(0.1941)	1.5211***	(0.0311)	3.8307***	(0.0424)
No-F Univ-M	4.1632***	(0.4188)	1.4395***	(0.0909)	5.0770***	(0.0511)
SomePrim-F No-M	4.8959***	(0.2664)	1.5906***	(0.0632)	4.9220***	(0.0303)
SomePrim-F SomePrim-M	4.8192***	(0.1759)	1.5834***	(0.0328)	5.2207***	(0.0417)
SomePrim-F PrimComp-M	4.6993***	(0.1948)	1.5530***	(0.0307)	4.7156***	(0.0429)
SomePrim-F Sec-M	4.3349***	(0.2299)	1.4658***	(0.0560)	4.1765***	(0.0432)
SomePrim-F Univ-M	3.7698***	(0.1173)	1.2975***	(0.0302)	3.6745***	(0.0976)
PrimComp-F No-M	4.2648***	(0.1631)	1.4689***	(0.0299)	3.7843***	(0.0556)
PrimComp-F SomePrim-M	4.6475***	(0.1386)	1.5377***	(0.0188)	4.3074***	(0.0401)
PrimComp-F PrimComp-M	4.3639***	(0.1507)	1.4823***	(0.0298)	4.0105***	(0.0426)
PrimComp-F Sec-M	4.0922***	(0.2444)	1.4195***	(0.0628)	3.6462***	(0.0404)
PrimComp-F Univ-M	3.3878***	(0.1078)	1.2167***	(0.0261)	3.1335***	(0.0397)

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	Model A				Model B			
	OLS		Poisson		OLS		Poisson	
	coef	(se)	coef	(se)	coef	(se)	coef	(se)
Sec-F No-M	4.2338***	(0.2503)	1.4607***	(0.0461)	5.0770***	(0.0427)	1.6119***	(0.0073)
Sec-F SomePrim-M	3.8922***	(0.0642)	1.3521***	(0.0137)	3.3710***	(0.0431)	1.1951***	(0.0120)
Sec-F PrimComp-M	3.5248***	(0.1097)	1.2653***	(0.0444)	3.2219***	(0.0433)	1.1490***	(0.0120)
Sec-F Sec-M	3.4216***	(0.1517)	1.2205***	(0.0350)	2.8833***	(0.0402)	1.0363***	(0.0114)
Sec-F Univ-M	3.1249***	(0.1856)	1.1005***	(0.0461)	2.5795***	(0.0422)	0.9231***	(0.0121)
Univ-F No-M	4.3186***	(0.2677)	1.4717***	(0.0604)	5.2665***	(0.0956)	1.5036***	(0.0091)
Univ-F SomePrim-M	3.2777***	(0.1238)	1.1271***	(0.0419)	2.3996***	(0.0472)	0.8473***	(0.0146)
Univ-F PrimComp-M	2.9885***	(0.3418)	1.0755***	(0.0580)	2.0895***	(0.0433)	0.7078***	(0.0129)
Univ-F Sec-M	2.7503***	(0.2256)	1.0294***	(0.0259)	2.4317***	(0.0462)	0.8622***	(0.0122)
Univ-F Univ-M	2.8314***	(0.2852)	1.0192***	(0.0314)	2.3128***	(0.0427)	0.8119***	(0.0119)
<i>Religion X Education</i>								
Buddhist No-F No-M					-0.3025	(0.2212)	-0.0480	(0.0409)
Buddhist No-F SomePrim-M					-0.2595**	(0.0912)	-0.0377*	(0.0215)
Buddhist No-F PrimComp-M					0.2246**	(0.0720)	0.0498***	(0.0152)
Buddhist No-F Sec-M					0.7891***	(0.1523)	0.1957***	(0.0381)
Buddhist No-F Univ-M					-0.6482	(0.3246)	-0.1494	(0.0916)
Buddhist SomePrim-F No-M					0.4916**	(0.1278)	0.1103***	(0.0294)
Buddhist SomePrim-F SomePrim-M					-0.1476*	(0.0621)	-0.0169	(0.0134)
Buddhist SomePrim-F PrimComp-M					0.0330	(0.0642)	0.0035	(0.0188)
Buddhist SomePrim-F Sec-M					0.3054***	(0.0591)	0.0378***	(0.0097)
Buddhist SomePrim-F Univ-M					0.4237*	(0.1662)	0.0491	(0.0425)
Buddhist PrimComp-F No-M					0.8212**	(0.2079)	0.2052***	(0.0501)
Buddhist PrimComp-F SomePrim-M					0.3855***	(0.0741)	0.0755***	(0.0097)
Buddhist PrimComp-F PrimComp-M					0.3713**	(0.1036)	0.0777**	(0.0307)
Buddhist PrimComp-F Sec-M					0.4392**	(0.1226)	0.0600***	(0.0163)
Buddhist PrimComp-F Univ-M					0.7519***	(0.1508)	0.1558***	(0.0202)
Buddhist Sec-F No-M					-0.8368	(0.4417)	-0.1723	(0.1079)

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	Model A			Model B		
	OLS		Poisson	OLS		Poisson
	coef	(se)	coef	(se)	coef	(se)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
Buddhist Sec-F SomePrim-M			0.9508***	(0.1053)	0.1993***	(0.0186)
Buddhist Sec-F PrimComp-M			0.7336***	(0.1295)	0.1173***	(0.0358)
Buddhist Sec-F Sec-M			1.1591***	(0.1455)	0.2248***	(0.0222)
Buddhist Sec-F Univ-M			1.1958***	(0.1384)	0.2335***	(0.0265)
Buddhist Univ-F No-M			0.2331***	(0.0295)	0.1860***	(0.0217)
Buddhist Univ-F SomePrim-M			1.3218***	(0.1020)	0.2729***	(0.0171)
Buddhist Univ-F PrimComp-M			1.8454***	(0.1111)	0.5152***	(0.0224)
Buddhist Univ-F Sec-M			1.2380***	(0.1536)	0.2037***	(0.0394)
Buddhist Univ-F Univ-M			1.4429***	(0.1221)	0.3231***	(0.0267)
Hindu No-F No-M			-1.0374**	(0.2741)	-0.1785***	(0.0530)
Hindu No-F SomePrim-M			-0.6960**	(0.2108)	-0.1127***	(0.0393)
Hindu No-F PrimComp-M			-0.1250	(0.3530)	-0.0041	(0.0644)
Hindu No-F Sec-M			1.4144***	(0.2914)	0.3319***	(0.0508)
Hindu No-F Univ-M			2.1732***	(0.1387)	0.3250***	(0.0282)
Hindu SomePrim-F No-M			0.5640*	(0.2377)	0.1164***	(0.0405)
Hindu SomePrim-F SomePrim-M			-0.0532	(0.0664)	0.0045	(0.0136)
Hindu SomePrim-F PrimComp-M			0.7823	(0.6049)	0.1612*	(0.0980)
Hindu SomePrim-F Sec-M			0.7438**	(0.2054)	0.1872***	(0.0384)
Hindu PrimComp-F No-M			0.6536**	(0.1695)	0.1979***	(0.0356)
Hindu PrimComp-F SomePrim-M			0.4674	(0.2891)	0.1296**	(0.0538)
Hindu PrimComp-F PrimComp-M			0.4846*	(0.2226)	0.1494***	(0.0434)
Hindu PrimComp-F Sec-M			2.2074***	(0.1026)	0.4814***	(0.0217)
Hindu PrimComp-F Univ-M			0.5298	(0.6256)	0.2234	(0.1406)
Hindu Sec-F SomePrim-M			0.8604***	(0.1527)	0.2770***	(0.0324)
Hindu Sec-F PrimComp-M			0.5670***	(0.1038)	0.2249***	(0.0221)
Hindu Sec-F Sec-M			1.5091	(0.7768)	0.4640***	(0.1534)
Hindu Sec-F Univ-M			1.1865***	(0.1197)	0.4498***	(0.0258)
Hindu Univ-F Univ-M			0.9374***	(0.1333)	0.4402***	(0.0292)

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	Model A			Model B		
	OLS		Poisson	OLS		Poisson
	coef	(se)	coef	(se)	coef	(se)
		(1)		(2)		(3)
						(4)
Muslim No-F No-M					-0.8648***	(0.1792)
Muslim No-F SomePrim-M					-0.4384**	(0.1207)
Muslim No-F PrimComp-M					0.2131	(0.1397)
Muslim No-F Sec-M					1.8023***	(0.1423)
Muslim No-F Univ-M					0.6290***	(0.0403)
Muslim SomePrim-F No-M					0.5032**	(0.1550)
Muslim SomePrim-F SomePrim-M					0.5580***	(0.1166)
Muslim SomePrim-F PrimComp-M					1.1257***	(0.0996)
Muslim SomePrim-F Sec-M					1.8889***	(0.1700)
Muslim SomePrim-F Univ-M					1.3864***	(0.2541)
Muslim PrimComp-F No-M					1.2342***	(0.1468)
Muslim PrimComp-F SomePrim-M					1.2732***	(0.0977)
Muslim PrimComp-F PrimComp-M					1.8116***	(0.1060)
Muslim PrimComp-F Sec-M					2.4096***	(0.1031)
Muslim PrimComp-F Univ-M					1.2571***	(0.1509)
Muslim Sec-F No-M					1.0128**	(0.2686)
Muslim Sec-F SomePrim-M					1.4374***	(0.1486)
Muslim Sec-F PrimComp-M					1.8757***	(0.1163)
Muslim Sec-F Sec-M					1.9393***	(0.1061)
Muslim Sec-F Univ-M					1.6243***	(0.1121)
Muslim Univ-F SomePrim-M					4.4263***	(0.2325)
Muslim Univ-F PrimComp-M					2.8738**	(0.9567)
Muslim Univ-F Sec-M					0.6784	(1.0022)
Muslim Univ-F Univ-M					1.4853**	(0.4691)
Catholic No-F No-M					-0.4283*	(0.2121)
Catholic No-F SomePrim-M					0.3580*	(0.1748)
Catholic No-F PrimComp-M					0.6368***	(0.1440)
Catholic No-F Sec-M					1.3417***	(0.1025)

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	Model A			Model B		
	OLS		Poisson	OLS		Poisson
	coef	(se)	coef	(se)	coef	(se)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
Catholic No-F Univ-M	-2.5412***	(0.5000)	0.3163***	(0.0217)		
Catholic SomePrim-F No-M	0.8985***	(0.1368)	-0.5570***	(0.0880)		
Catholic SomePrim-F SomePrim-M	0.6864***	(0.1325)	0.1755***	(0.0208)		
Catholic SomePrim-F PrimComp-M	1.0562***	(0.0741)	0.1327***	(0.0150)		
Catholic SomePrim-F Sec-M	1.1277***	(0.1361)	0.2098***	(0.0144)		
Catholic SomePrim-F Univ-M	0.8775***	(0.1395)	0.2514***	(0.0252)		
Catholic PrimComp-F No-M	1.5582***	(0.1532)	0.2315***	(0.0232)		
Catholic PrimComp-F SomePrim-M	1.4870***	(0.0709)	0.3590***	(0.0293)		
Catholic PrimComp-F PrimComp-M	1.2916***	(0.1130)	0.3066***	(0.0088)		
Catholic PrimComp-F Sec-M	1.1833***	(0.0732)	0.2914***	(0.0209)		
Catholic PrimComp-F Univ-M	0.8916	(0.5016)	0.2975***	(0.0129)		
Catholic Sec-F No-M	-0.2719	(0.5097)	0.2750**	(0.1174)		
Catholic Sec-F SomePrim-M	1.1882***	(0.0905)	-0.0427	(0.1013)		
Catholic Sec-F PrimComp-M	1.1279***	(0.1397)	0.3213***	(0.0166)		
Catholic Sec-F Sec-M	1.1604***	(0.0960)	0.3213***	(0.0306)		
Catholic Sec-F Univ-M	1.2107***	(0.1040)	0.3630***	(0.0205)		
Catholic Univ-F No-M	-0.7676***	(0.1210)	0.4087***	(0.0290)		
Catholic Univ-F SomePrim-M	1.4538***	(0.0593)	0.5051***	(0.0123)		
Catholic Univ-F PrimComp-M	1.4155***	(0.0503)	0.5482***	(0.0134)		
Catholic Univ-F Sec-M	0.9883***	(0.0657)	0.3748***	(0.0127)		
Catholic Univ-F Univ-M	1.0142***	(0.0796)	0.3975***	(0.0184)		
Protestant No-F No-M	-0.6501***	(0.1610)	-0.1055***	(0.0321)		
Protestant No-F SomePrim-M	0.3504**	(0.1086)	0.0599**	(0.0236)		
Protestant No-F PrimComp-M	0.7846***	(0.1107)	0.1505***	(0.0232)		
Protestant No-F Sec-M	2.5388***	(0.1880)	0.5096***	(0.0312)		
Protestant No-F Univ-M	-2.6678***	(0.1058)	-0.6277***	(0.0216)		
Protestant SomePrim-F No-M	0.6292***	(0.1312)	0.1292***	(0.0255)		
Protestant SomePrim-F SomePrim-M	0.9528***	(0.0943)	0.1673***	(0.0188)		

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	Model A			Model B		
	OLS		Poisson	OLS		Poisson
	coef	(se)	coef	(se)	coef	(se)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
Protestant SomePrim-F PrimComp-M	1.2532***	(0.0759)	0.2395***	(0.0167)		
Protestant SomePrim-F Sec-M	2.2142***	(0.4621)	0.4251***	(0.0649)		
Protestant SomePrim-F Univ-M	1.7633***	(0.2594)	0.4069***	(0.0489)		
Protestant PrimComp-F No-M	1.2274**	(0.3427)	0.3009***	(0.0625)		
Protestant PrimComp-F SomePrim-M	1.6564***	(0.1582)	0.3316***	(0.0233)		
Protestant PrimComp-F PrimComp-M	1.4326***	(0.1022)	0.3184***	(0.0192)		
Protestant PrimComp-F Sec-M	1.8124***	(0.2171)	0.4177***	(0.0371)		
Protestant PrimComp-F Univ-M	1.2178***	(0.1966)	0.3629***	(0.0363)		
Protestant Sec-F No-M	-1.2033***	(0.1500)	-0.2326***	(0.0244)		
Protestant Sec-F SomePrim-M	1.7171***	(0.1605)	0.4307***	(0.0317)		
Protestant Sec-F PrimComp-M	1.2512***	(0.1640)	0.3572***	(0.0405)		
Protestant Sec-F Sec-M	1.2292***	(0.0456)	0.3918***	(0.0167)		
Protestant Sec-F Univ-M	1.3234***	(0.1263)	0.4572***	(0.0402)		
Protestant Univ-F SomePrim-M	0.5626***	(0.0455)	0.2441***	(0.0143)		
Protestant Univ-F PrimComp-M	1.4087***	(0.0751)	0.5528***	(0.0196)		
Protestant Univ-F Sec-M	0.9437***	(0.0619)	0.3674***	(0.0091)		
Protestant Univ-F Univ-M	0.8746***	(0.0927)	0.3618***	(0.0178)		
Other No-F No-M	-0.4501*	(0.1921)	-0.0710**	(0.0339)		
Other No-F SomePrim-M	0.0544	(0.1273)	0.0098	(0.0235)		
Other No-F PrimComp-M	0.5349**	(0.1786)	0.1070***	(0.0265)		
Other No-F Sec-M	1.5289**	(0.4796)	0.3532***	(0.0861)		
Other SomePrim-F No-M	0.6567**	(0.2473)	0.1335***	(0.0393)		
Other SomePrim-F SomePrim-M	0.1984	(0.1520)	0.0413	(0.0251)		
Other SomePrim-F PrimComp-M	0.2476	(0.1619)	0.0615**	(0.0287)		
Other SomePrim-F Sec-M	0.9098*	(0.3891)	0.2019**	(0.0789)		
Other SomePrim-F Univ-M	-0.2096	(0.9616)	-0.0150	(0.2302)		
Other PrimComp-F No-M	1.1768	(0.7735)	0.2920**	(0.1397)		
Other PrimComp-F SomePrim-M	0.8113***	(0.1933)	0.1846***	(0.0377)		

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	Model A				Model B			
	OLS		Poisson		OLS		Poisson	
	coef	(se)	coef	(se)	coef	(se)	coef	(se)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Other PrimComp-F PrimComp-M					0.7172**	(0.1866)	0.1867***	(0.0357)
Other PrimComp-F Sec-M					0.8357*	(0.3439)	0.2239***	(0.0753)
Other PrimComp-F Univ-M					0.2056	(0.4144)	0.0540	(0.2140)
Other Sec-F No-M					-2.2030***	(0.0326)	-0.5411***	(0.0036)
Other Sec-F SomePrim-M					4.0508***	(0.8153)	0.7873***	(0.1087)
Other Sec-F PrimComp-M					0.3880	(0.2536)	0.1397*	(0.0805)
Other Sec-F Sec-M					0.5245	(0.4376)	0.1805	(0.1337)
Other Sec-F Univ-M					1.2925*	(0.5695)	0.3147*	(0.1748)
Other Univ-F PrimComp-M					2.3035***	(0.0565)	0.7725***	(0.0112)
Other Univ-F Sec-M					0.8181***	(0.0765)	0.3270***	(0.0131)
Other Univ-F Univ-M					0.6947	(0.5301)	0.2977*	(0.1684)
<i>Birth Year</i>								
1900	-0.8296***	(0.2016)	-0.1268***	(0.0369)	-1.0681***	(0.0240)	-0.1737***	(0.0087)
1901	-0.8667**	(0.2723)	-0.1326***	(0.0514)	-1.1403***	(0.2572)	-0.1850***	(0.0481)
1902	-0.8348***	(0.1853)	-0.1262***	(0.0344)	-1.0921***	(0.0505)	-0.1760***	(0.0126)
1903	-0.6750**	(0.2530)	-0.1021**	(0.0468)	-0.8953***	(0.2105)	-0.1456***	(0.0382)
1904	-0.7491**	(0.1954)	-0.1144***	(0.0351)	-0.9600***	(0.0267)	-0.1563***	(0.0071)
1905	-0.1295	(0.1878)	-0.0158	(0.0346)	-0.3597***	(0.0687)	-0.0607***	(0.0128)
1906	-0.4312*	(0.1961)	-0.0626*	(0.0361)	-0.6606***	(0.1395)	-0.1069***	(0.0242)
1907	-0.7369**	(0.1918)	-0.1113***	(0.0361)	-0.9764***	(0.1070)	-0.1577***	(0.0213)
1908	-0.4899*	(0.2130)	-0.0727*	(0.0391)	-0.6729***	(0.1631)	-0.1091***	(0.0290)
1909	-0.4258*	(0.1825)	-0.0629*	(0.0342)	-0.5906***	(0.0299)	-0.0971***	(0.0086)
1910	-0.5262**	(0.1868)	-0.0846***	(0.0320)	-0.5872***	(0.0553)	-0.0989***	(0.0096)
1911	-0.6518*	(0.3032)	-0.1032**	(0.0504)	-0.7731***	(0.1708)	-0.1280***	(0.0260)
1912	-0.6042**	(0.2092)	-0.0960***	(0.0350)	-0.6978***	(0.0791)	-0.1152***	(0.0121)
1913	-0.2193	(0.1660)	-0.0320	(0.0308)	-0.3162***	(0.0665)	-0.0518***	(0.0122)
1914	-0.3886	(0.2126)	-0.0598	(0.0379)	-0.4693***	(0.0792)	-0.0764***	(0.0142)

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	Model A				Model B			
	OLS		Poisson		OLS		Poisson	
	coef	(se)	coef	(se)	coef	(se)	coef	(se)
1915	-0.3688***	(0.0722)	-0.0571***	(0.0155)	-0.4251***	(0.0954)	-0.0695***	(0.0190)
1916	-0.1326	(0.1061)	-0.0190	(0.0232)	-0.2284**	(0.0635)	-0.0376***	(0.0112)
1917	-0.3837*	(0.1634)	-0.0595**	(0.0300)	-0.4654***	(0.0421)	-0.0761***	(0.0097)
1918	-0.1612	(0.1099)	-0.0227	(0.0229)	-0.2392***	(0.0535)	-0.0384***	(0.0098)
1919	-0.3419***	(0.0665)	-0.0527***	(0.0153)	-0.3971**	(0.1337)	-0.0638***	(0.0240)
1920	-0.3740**	(0.1123)	-0.0580***	(0.0214)	-0.4548***	(0.0288)	-0.0750***	(0.0082)
1921	-0.2685**	(0.0990)	-0.0368*	(0.0196)	-0.4421***	(0.0560)	-0.0712***	(0.0122)
1922	-0.0736	(0.1019)	-0.0033	(0.0188)	-0.2359***	(0.0335)	-0.0355***	(0.0081)
1923	-0.0142	(0.0470)	0.0070	(0.0120)	-0.1625	(0.0892)	-0.0222	(0.0169)
1924	0.0004	(0.1034)	0.0091	(0.0197)	-0.1515***	(0.0228)	-0.0209***	(0.0072)
1925	-0.2173*	(0.0995)	-0.0293	(0.0192)	-0.3129***	(0.0287)	-0.0487***	(0.0082)
1926	0.0842	(0.0657)	0.0232*	(0.0132)	-0.0674	(0.0478)	-0.0061	(0.0105)
1927	0.0379	(0.0972)	0.0153	(0.0180)	-0.1128***	(0.0237)	-0.0139*	(0.0071)
1928	0.0286	(0.1007)	0.0136	(0.0186)	-0.1006**	(0.0276)	-0.0114	(0.0076)
1929	-0.0301	(0.0444)	0.0034	(0.0114)	-0.1470	(0.0956)	-0.0197	(0.0181)
1930	-0.1093	(0.0568)	-0.0112	(0.0134)	-0.2250**	(0.0595)	-0.0338***	(0.0120)
1931	0.2106***	(0.0431)	0.0461***	(0.0123)	0.0324	(0.0756)	0.0115	(0.0165)
1932	0.1704	(0.1276)	0.0387*	(0.0217)	-0.0104	(0.0623)	0.0037	(0.0112)
1933	0.1513	(0.1045)	0.0358*	(0.0183)	-0.0292	(0.0406)	0.0008	(0.0083)
1934	0.1914**	(0.0714)	0.0430***	(0.0141)	0.0084	(0.0297)	0.0072	(0.0087)
1935	-0.0243	(0.0659)	0.0039	(0.0144)	-0.1694***	(0.0302)	-0.0240***	(0.0079)
1936	-0.1635*	(0.0660)	-0.0297**	(0.0133)	-0.3138***	(0.0275)	-0.0583***	(0.0091)
1937	-0.0771	(0.0684)	-0.0107	(0.0133)	-0.2274***	(0.0358)	-0.0388***	(0.0100)
1938	-0.1570**	(0.0609)	-0.0281**	(0.0125)	-0.2978***	(0.0322)	-0.0541***	(0.0099)
1939	-0.2250**	(0.0705)	-0.0431***	(0.0154)	-0.3617***	(0.0506)	-0.0688***	(0.0144)
1940	0.5446***	(0.0831)	0.1299***	(0.0325)	0.5208***	(0.0903)	0.1240***	(0.0344)
1941	0.2625	(0.1357)	0.0568	(0.0370)	0.2495	(0.1287)	0.0545	(0.0350)
1942	0.2003***	(0.0479)	0.0430***	(0.0164)	0.1891***	(0.0436)	0.0415***	(0.0151)

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	Model A				Model B			
	OLS		Poisson		OLS		Poisson	
	coef	(se)	coef	(se)	coef	(se)	coef	(se)
1943	0.1336***	(0.0131)	0.0283***	(0.0038)	0.1260***	(0.0171)	0.0278***	(0.0041)
1944	0.0847***	(0.0139)	0.0181***	(0.0021)	0.0857***	(0.0134)	0.0188***	(0.0010)
1946	-0.1280**	(0.0455)	-0.0416**	(0.0188)	-0.1047*	(0.0428)	-0.0344*	(0.0186)
1947	-0.2084***	(0.0449)	-0.0676***	(0.0199)	-0.1878***	(0.0411)	-0.0595***	(0.0205)
1948	-0.3559***	(0.0566)	-0.1296***	(0.0262)	-0.3280***	(0.0518)	-0.1223***	(0.0268)
1949	-0.4272***	(0.0520)	-0.1528***	(0.0210)	-0.4053***	(0.0388)	-0.1450***	(0.0195)
1950	-0.6130***	(0.0574)	-0.2163***	(0.0193)	-0.5907***	(0.0483)	-0.2082***	(0.0168)
1951	-0.5845***	(0.0422)	-0.2072***	(0.0151)	-0.5584***	(0.0301)	-0.1995***	(0.0127)
1952	-0.6054***	(0.0516)	-0.2143***	(0.0130)	-0.5888***	(0.0426)	-0.2072***	(0.0102)
1953	-0.6837***	(0.0462)	-0.2359***	(0.0128)	-0.6471***	(0.0252)	-0.2242***	(0.0084)
1954	-0.7625***	(0.0598)	-0.2606***	(0.0140)	-0.7322***	(0.0415)	-0.2496***	(0.0091)
1955	-0.8334***	(0.0473)	-0.2981***	(0.0182)	-0.8031***	(0.0237)	-0.2854***	(0.0138)
1956	-0.8515***	(0.0620)	-0.2647***	(0.0162)	-0.7893***	(0.0266)	-0.2473***	(0.0100)
1957	-0.8388***	(0.0537)	-0.2623***	(0.0147)	-0.7908***	(0.0263)	-0.2484***	(0.0096)
1958	-0.9557***	(0.0446)	-0.2862***	(0.0131)	-0.9274***	(0.0258)	-0.2766***	(0.0091)
1959	-0.8469***	(0.0396)	-0.2643***	(0.0123)	-0.8311***	(0.0251)	-0.2575***	(0.0088)
1960	-0.9239***	(0.0337)	-0.2801***	(0.0113)	-0.9213***	(0.0249)	-0.2762***	(0.0086)
1961	-1.0255***	(0.0293)	-0.3009***	(0.0105)	-1.0376***	(0.0246)	-0.3005***	(0.0083)
1962	-1.1312***	(0.0297)	-0.3227***	(0.0105)	-1.1441***	(0.0242)	-0.3226***	(0.0082)
1963	-1.2378***	(0.0295)	-0.3455***	(0.0104)	-1.2572***	(0.0248)	-0.3468***	(0.0082)
<i>Census</i>								
Cambodia 1998	1.7100***	(0.2060)	0.2797***	(0.0412)	1.4820***	(0.1123)	0.2559***	(0.0180)
Cambodia 2008	0.9924***	(0.1228)	0.2798***	(0.0259)	0.9195***	(0.1118)	0.2881***	(0.0180)
Indonesia 1980	0.7317***	(0.1163)	0.1072***	(0.0264)	0.7790***	(0.1494)	0.1335***	(0.0271)
Malaysia 1970	1.0592***	(0.1086)	0.1671***	(0.0246)	1.0237***	(0.1314)	0.1784***	(0.0225)
Malaysia 1980	0.9475***	(0.1057)	0.1455***	(0.0234)	0.9976***	(0.1367)	0.1740***	(0.0240)
Vietnam 1999	0.5188***	(0.0479)	0.1900***	(0.0096)	0.5701***	(0.0644)	0.2217***	(0.0119)
<i>continued on next page</i>								

	Model A				Model B			
	OLS		Poisson		OLS		Poisson	
	(1)	(se)	(2)	(se)	(3)	(se)	(4)	(se)
Thailand 1970	coef	2.1661***	coef	0.3533***	coef	1.8574***	coef	0.3157***
Thailand 1980		(0.1343)		(0.0283)		(0.1364)		(0.0215)
Thailand 1990		(0.0951)		(0.0213)		(0.1306)		(0.0200)
Thailand 2000		(0.0752)		(0.0156)		(0.1050)		(0.0172)
		(0.0796)		(0.0189)		(0.1158)		(0.0182)
Observations	561,948		561,948		561,948		561,948	
R-squared	0.7540				0.7565			
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$								

Table A. Regression Results

B Robustness to Removing Philippines and Thailand from Sample

	Full sample		Sample excl. Philippines		Sample excl. Thailand	
	Model A		Model A		Model A	
	coef	(se)	coef	(se)	coef	(se)
<i>Religion</i>						
Buddhist	0.3308***	(0.0725)	0.3644**	(0.0803)	0.2744**	(0.0869)
Hindu	0.2185	(0.1127)	0.2668*	(0.1149)	0.2201*	(0.0921)
Muslim	0.5599***	(0.0907)	0.6113***	(0.0726)	0.5308***	(0.0800)
Catholic	0.9142***	(0.0461)	0.8840***	(0.0743)	0.8773***	(0.0633)
Protestant	1.0403***	(0.0803)	1.1192***	(0.1099)	0.9373***	(0.0543)
Other	0.6753***	(0.1113)	0.6963***	(0.1227)	0.6611***	(0.1166)
Observations	561,948		474,733		498,447	
R-squared	0.7540		0.7524		0.7517	
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$						

Table B. Robustness of Model A to Removing Philippines and Thailand from Sample

	Full sample		Sample excl. Philippines		Sample excl. Thailand	
	Model B		Model B		Model B	
	coef	(se)	coef	(se)	coef	(se)
<i>Religion X Education</i>						
Buddhist No-F No-M	-0.3025	(0.2212)	-0.3162	(0.2022)	-0.5490***	(0.0771)
Buddhist No-F SomePrim-M	-0.2595**	(0.0912)	-0.2146	(0.1045)	-0.2955***	(0.0588)
Buddhist No-F PrimComp-M	0.2246**	(0.0720)	0.2971***	(0.0589)	0.2586**	(0.0917)
Buddhist No-F Sec-M	0.7891***	(0.1523)	0.8442***	(0.1655)	0.9657***	(0.1074)
Buddhist No-F Univ-M	-0.6482	(0.3246)	-0.6000	(0.3423)	-0.0244	(0.9472)
Buddhist SomePrim-F No-M	0.4916**	(0.1278)	0.5594**	(0.1379)	0.0691	(0.0809)
Buddhist SomePrim-F SomePrim-M	-0.1476*	(0.0621)	-0.0928	(0.0762)	-0.1218	(0.1174)
Buddhist SomePrim-F PrimComp-M	0.0330	(0.0642)	0.0853	(0.0764)	0.1886*	(0.0736)
Buddhist SomePrim-F Sec-M	0.3054***	(0.0591)	0.3594***	(0.0762)	0.3923***	(0.0711)
Buddhist SomePrim-F Univ-M	0.4237*	(0.1662)	0.5644***	(0.1080)	-0.0038	(0.1376)
Buddhist PrimComp-F No-M	0.8212**	(0.2079)	0.8673**	(0.2231)	1.0147***	(0.0805)
Buddhist PrimComp-F SomePrim-M	0.3855***	(0.0741)	0.4424***	(0.0884)	0.3207***	(0.0481)
Buddhist PrimComp-F PrimComp-M	0.3713**	(0.1036)	0.4241**	(0.1210)	0.3354*	(0.1387)
Buddhist PrimComp-F Sec-M	0.4392**	(0.1226)	0.4929**	(0.1420)	0.2055	(0.1335)
Buddhist PrimComp-F Univ-M	0.7519***	(0.1508)	0.8047***	(0.1629)	0.2722	(0.1374)
Buddhist Sec-F No-M	-0.8368	(0.4417)	-0.7801	(0.4516)	-0.3339***	(0.0491)
Buddhist Sec-F SomePrim-M	0.9508***	(0.1053)	1.0071***	(0.1242)	0.6670	(0.4114)
Buddhist Sec-F PrimComp-M	0.7336***	(0.1295)	0.7891***	(0.1496)	0.5243	(0.3026)
Buddhist Sec-F Sec-M	1.1591***	(0.1455)	1.2150***	(0.1640)	0.4884*	(0.2262)
Buddhist Sec-F Univ-M	1.1958***	(0.1384)	1.2519***	(0.1560)	0.2846	(0.1749)
Buddhist Univ-F No-M	0.2331***	(0.0295)	-0.1060	(0.0796)	0.1862*	(0.0853)
Buddhist Univ-F SomePrim-M	1.3218***	(0.1020)	1.3812***	(0.1141)	0.4841***	(0.0435)
Buddhist Univ-F PrimComp-M	1.8454***	(0.1111)	1.8961***	(0.1274)	0.7078	(0.5118)
Buddhist Univ-F Sec-M	1.2380***	(0.1536)	1.2891***	(0.1701)	-0.2718	(0.3334)
Buddhist Univ-F Univ-M	1.4429***	(0.1221)	1.5028***	(0.1354)	0.1481	(0.0900)
Hindu No-F No-M	-1.0374**	(0.2741)	-1.0221**	(0.2864)	-1.1162**	(0.2627)
Hindu No-F SomePrim-M	-0.6960**	(0.2108)	-0.6213*	(0.2444)	-0.7096**	(0.2336)

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	Full sample		Sample excl. Philippines		Sample excl. Thailand	
	Model B		Model B		Model B	
	coef	(se)	coef	(se)	coef	(se)
Hindu No-F PrimComp-M	-0.1250	(0.3530)	-0.0282	(0.3865)	-0.1280	(0.3813)
Hindu No-F Sec-M	1.4144***	(0.2914)	1.4968**	(0.3296)	1.4252**	(0.3250)
Hindu No-F Univ-M	2.1732***	(0.1387)	2.2621***	(0.1742)	2.0954***	(0.1281)
Hindu SomePrim-F No-M	0.5640*	(0.2377)	0.6589*	(0.2673)	0.5528	(0.2606)
Hindu SomePrim-F SomePrim-M	-0.0532	(0.0664)	0.0306	(0.0428)	-0.0416	(0.0705)
Hindu SomePrim-F PrimComp-M	0.7823	(0.6049)	0.8592	(0.6492)	0.7687	(0.6306)
Hindu SomePrim-F Sec-M	0.7438**	(0.2054)	0.8291**	(0.2415)	0.7446**	(0.2317)
Hindu PrimComp-F No-M	0.6536**	(0.1695)	0.7240**	(0.2004)	0.6114**	(0.1676)
Hindu PrimComp-F SomePrim-M	0.4674	(0.2891)	0.5476	(0.3241)	0.4589	(0.3107)
Hindu PrimComp-F PrimComp-M	0.4846*	(0.2226)	0.5611**	(0.1869)	0.4662*	(0.2162)
Hindu PrimComp-F Sec-M	2.2074***	(0.1026)	2.2977***	(0.1287)	2.2138***	(0.1335)
Hindu PrimComp-F Univ-M	0.5298	(0.6256)	0.6092	(0.6712)	0.5192	(0.6236)
Hindu Sec-F SomePrim-M	0.8604***	(0.1527)	0.9491***	(0.1919)	0.7929***	(0.1394)
Hindu Sec-F PrimComp-M	0.5670***	(0.1038)	0.6554***	(0.1325)	0.5662**	(0.1322)
Hindu Sec-F Sec-M	1.5091	(0.7768)	1.5967	(0.8335)	1.4834	(0.7956)
Hindu Sec-F Univ-M	1.1865***	(0.1197)	1.2755***	(0.1541)	1.1660***	(0.1392)
Hindu Univ-F Univ-M	0.9374***	(0.1333)	1.0282***	(0.1690)	0.8870***	(0.1315)
Muslim No-F No-M	-0.8648***	(0.1792)	-0.8474***	(0.1617)	-0.9337***	(0.1343)
Muslim No-F SomePrim-M	-0.4384**	(0.1207)	-0.3615*	(0.1456)	-0.4583**	(0.1351)
Muslim No-F PrimComp-M	0.2131	(0.1397)	0.3146	(0.1625)	0.2082	(0.1645)
Muslim No-F Sec-M	1.8023***	(0.1423)	1.9190***	(0.1750)	1.8430***	(0.1769)
Muslim No-F Univ-M	0.6290***	(0.0403)	0.6600***	(0.0552)	0.6053***	(0.0261)
Muslim SomePrim-F No-M	0.5032**	(0.1550)	0.6000**	(0.1829)	0.4525**	(0.1462)
Muslim SomePrim-F SomePrim-M	0.5580***	(0.1166)	0.6492**	(0.1450)	0.5356**	(0.1339)
Muslim SomePrim-F PrimComp-M	1.1257***	(0.0996)	1.2230***	(0.1147)	1.1350***	(0.1252)
Muslim SomePrim-F Sec-M	1.8889***	(0.1700)	1.9852***	(0.1548)	2.0007***	(0.1536)
Muslim SomePrim-F Univ-M	1.3864***	(0.2541)	1.6309***	(0.0853)	1.4359***	(0.2827)
Muslim PrimComp-F No-M	1.2342***	(0.1468)	1.3357***	(0.1851)	1.2232***	(0.1722)

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	Full sample		Sample excl. Philippines		Sample excl. Thailand	
	Model B		Model B		Model B	
	coef	(se)	coef	(se)	coef	(se)
Muslim PrimComp-F SomePrim-M	1.2732***	(0.0977)	1.3757***	(0.1091)	1.2794***	(0.1209)
Muslim PrimComp-F PrimComp-M	1.8116***	(0.1060)	1.9259***	(0.0934)	1.8237***	(0.1194)
Muslim PrimComp-F Sec-M	2.4096***	(0.1031)	2.5194***	(0.0825)	2.4350***	(0.1139)
Muslim PrimComp-F Univ-M	1.2571***	(0.1509)	1.2155***	(0.1543)	1.2894***	(0.1526)
Muslim Sec-F No-M	1.0128**	(0.2686)	1.2956***	(0.1420)	1.0293**	(0.2632)
Muslim Sec-F SomePrim-M	1.4374***	(0.1486)	1.5161***	(0.1877)	1.3813***	(0.1256)
Muslim Sec-F PrimComp-M	1.8757***	(0.1163)	1.9821***	(0.1015)	1.9291***	(0.1239)
Muslim Sec-F Sec-M	1.9393***	(0.1061)	2.0515***	(0.1032)	1.9675***	(0.1278)
Muslim Sec-F Univ-M	1.6243***	(0.1121)	1.6402***	(0.1228)	1.7272***	(0.1665)
Muslim Univ-F SomePrim-M	4.4263***	(0.2325)	4.6686***	(0.1446)	4.4005***	(0.2324)
Muslim Univ-F PrimComp-M	2.8738**	(0.9567)	3.0333**	(1.0645)	1.0111	(0.5575)
Muslim Univ-F Sec-M	0.6784	(1.0022)	-0.2112	(0.1327)	0.6887	(1.0502)
Muslim Univ-F Univ-M	1.4853**	(0.4691)	1.0036**	(0.2197)	1.5253*	(0.5815)
Catholic No-F No-M	-0.4283*	(0.2121)	-0.4446	(0.2279)	-0.5386**	(0.1691)
Catholic No-F SomePrim-M	0.3580*	(0.1748)	0.5060	(0.3023)	0.2621*	(0.1171)
Catholic No-F PrimComp-M	0.6368***	(0.1440)	0.7774***	(0.1673)	0.7281***	(0.1349)
Catholic No-F Sec-M	1.3417***	(0.1025)	1.4999***	(0.1431)	1.3492***	(0.0852)
Catholic No-F Univ-M	-2.5412***	(0.5000)	-3.1880***	(0.2160)	-2.1732**	(0.5444)
Catholic SomePrim-F No-M	0.8985***	(0.1368)	0.6809***	(0.1170)	0.9839***	(0.1255)
Catholic SomePrim-F SomePrim-M	0.6864***	(0.1325)	0.5671*	(0.2562)	0.8073***	(0.0412)
Catholic SomePrim-F PrimComp-M	1.0562***	(0.0741)	1.0100***	(0.0742)	1.0917***	(0.0756)
Catholic SomePrim-F Sec-M	1.1277***	(0.1361)	1.5063***	(0.1441)	1.1591***	(0.1317)
Catholic SomePrim-F Univ-M	0.8775***	(0.1395)	0.5757	(0.5335)	0.8576**	(0.1976)
Catholic PrimComp-F No-M	1.5582***	(0.1532)	1.3286**	(0.3133)	1.5837***	(0.1455)
Catholic PrimComp-F SomePrim-M	1.4870***	(0.0709)	1.4882***	(0.3007)	1.5496***	(0.0175)
Catholic PrimComp-F PrimComp-M	1.2916***	(0.1130)	1.0295**	(0.2639)	1.3323***	(0.1040)
Catholic PrimComp-F Sec-M	1.1833***	(0.0732)	1.4658***	(0.2394)	1.2305***	(0.0483)
Catholic PrimComp-F Univ-M	0.8916	(0.5016)	-0.3718	(0.4284)	0.9335	(0.5191)

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	Full sample		Sample excl. Philippines		Sample excl. Thailand	
	Model B		Model B		Model B	
	coef	(se)	coef	(se)	coef	(se)
Catholic Sec-F No-M	-0.2719	(0.5097)	-1.1945	(0.8039)	-0.2245	(0.5350)
Catholic Sec-F SomePrim-M	1.1882***	(0.0905)	0.7049***	(0.1033)	1.2382***	(0.0680)
Catholic Sec-F PrimComp-M	1.1279***	(0.1397)	0.5075**	(0.1109)	1.1694***	(0.1394)
Catholic Sec-F Sec-M	1.1604***	(0.0960)	0.8771*	(0.3220)	1.2049***	(0.0869)
Catholic Sec-F Univ-M	1.2107***	(0.1040)	0.9854**	(0.3375)	1.2464***	(0.1121)
Catholic Univ-F No-M	-0.7676***	(0.1210)	-0.6951***	(0.0005)		
Catholic Univ-F SomePrim-M	1.4538***	(0.0593)	1.4741***	(0.0475)		
Catholic Univ-F PrimComp-M	1.4155***	(0.0503)	1.6434***	(0.2568)	1.4436***	(0.0504)
Catholic Univ-F Sec-M	0.9883***	(0.0657)	0.5833	(0.5627)	1.0300***	(0.0557)
Catholic Univ-F Univ-M	1.0142***	(0.0796)	0.2705	(0.8490)	1.0517***	(0.0720)
Protestant No-F No-M	-0.6501***	(0.1610)	-0.6234**	(0.1750)	-0.7252***	(0.1290)
Protestant No-F SomePrim-M	0.3504**	(0.1086)	0.4215**	(0.1427)	0.3316*	(0.1271)
Protestant No-F PrimComp-M	0.7846***	(0.1107)	0.9057***	(0.1220)	0.7893***	(0.1345)
Protestant No-F Sec-M	2.5388***	(0.1880)	2.7328***	(0.2072)	2.5426***	(0.2057)
Protestant No-F Univ-M	-2.6678***	(0.1058)	-2.5786***	(0.1323)	-2.6959***	(0.1348)
Protestant SomePrim-F No-M	0.6292***	(0.1312)	0.6432***	(0.1377)	0.6399**	(0.1707)
Protestant SomePrim-F SomePrim-M	0.9528***	(0.0943)	1.0733***	(0.1308)	0.9581***	(0.1111)
Protestant SomePrim-F PrimComp-M	1.2532***	(0.0759)	1.3530***	(0.1251)	1.2613***	(0.0969)
Protestant SomePrim-F Sec-M	2.2142***	(0.4621)	2.6543***	(0.1166)	2.2172***	(0.4518)
Protestant SomePrim-F Univ-M	1.7633***	(0.2594)	1.5746***	(0.1385)	1.7614***	(0.2979)
Protestant PrimComp-F No-M	1.2274**	(0.3427)	0.9484***	(0.1369)	1.2385**	(0.3874)
Protestant PrimComp-F SomePrim-M	1.6564***	(0.1582)	1.9240***	(0.1219)	1.6761***	(0.1403)
Protestant PrimComp-F PrimComp-M	1.4326***	(0.1022)	1.6038***	(0.1277)	1.4453***	(0.0977)
Protestant PrimComp-F Sec-M	1.8124***	(0.2171)	2.1059***	(0.1225)	1.8266***	(0.1997)
Protestant PrimComp-F Univ-M	1.2178***	(0.1966)	1.1207***	(0.1316)	1.2248***	(0.2383)
Protestant Sec-F No-M	-1.2033***	(0.1500)	-1.2694***	(0.1215)	-1.1625***	(0.1914)
Protestant Sec-F SomePrim-M	1.7171***	(0.1605)	2.2162***	(0.1510)	1.7362***	(0.1342)
Protestant Sec-F PrimComp-M	1.2512***	(0.1640)	1.5834***	(0.1181)	1.2719***	(0.1403)

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	Full sample		Sample excl. Philippines		Sample excl. Thailand	
	Model B		Model B		Model B	
	coef	(se)	coef	(se)	coef	(se)
Protestant Sec-F Sec-M	1.2292***	(0.0456)	1.3312***	(0.1138)	1.2527***	(0.0563)
Protestant Sec-F Univ-M	1.3234***	(0.1263)	1.5788***	(0.1122)	1.3566***	(0.1033)
Protestant Univ-F SomePrim-M	0.5626***	(0.0455)	0.5514***	(0.0479)		
Protestant Univ-F PrimComp-M	1.4087***	(0.0751)	3.1877***	(0.1044)	1.4476***	(0.0468)
Protestant Univ-F Sec-M	0.9437***	(0.0619)	0.9608***	(0.1362)	0.9880***	(0.0571)
Protestant Univ-F Univ-M	0.8746***	(0.0927)	0.3905*	(0.1481)	0.9127***	(0.0974)
Other No-F No-M	-0.4501*	(0.1921)	-0.4344*	(0.1652)	-0.4758**	(0.1606)
Other No-F SomePrim-M	0.0544	(0.1273)	0.1086	(0.1545)	0.0318	(0.1409)
Other No-F PrimComp-M	0.5349**	(0.1786)	0.6149**	(0.2022)	0.5691**	(0.1751)
Other No-F Sec-M	1.5289**	(0.4796)	1.2818***	(0.1396)	1.5025**	(0.5019)
Other SomePrim-F No-M	0.6567**	(0.2473)	0.7567**	(0.2237)	0.7837**	(0.2373)
Other SomePrim-F SomePrim-M	0.1984	(0.1520)	0.1983	(0.1561)	0.2182	(0.1528)
Other SomePrim-F PrimComp-M	0.2476	(0.1619)	0.2138	(0.1407)	0.2356	(0.1651)
Other SomePrim-F Sec-M	0.9098*	(0.3891)	0.7724*	(0.2995)	0.9338*	(0.4276)
Other SomePrim-F Univ-M	-0.2096	(0.9616)	-0.1242	(0.9647)	-0.2130	(0.9901)
Other PrimComp-F No-M	1.1768	(0.7735)	1.2841	(0.8445)	1.1132	(0.8242)
Other PrimComp-F SomePrim-M	0.8113***	(0.1933)	0.6796***	(0.1386)	0.8258**	(0.1965)
Other PrimComp-F PrimComp-M	0.7172**	(0.1866)	0.6682**	(0.1659)	0.7190**	(0.1805)
Other PrimComp-F Sec-M	0.8357*	(0.3439)	0.5744**	(0.1900)	0.8486*	(0.3636)
Other PrimComp-F Univ-M	0.2056	(0.4144)	0.1250	(0.4314)	0.7014*	(0.3052)
Other Sec-F No-M	-2.2030***	(0.0326)	-2.1754***	(0.0330)		
Other Sec-F SomePrim-M	4.0508***	(0.8153)	4.6340***	(0.5586)	4.0700***	(0.8250)
Other Sec-F PrimComp-M	0.3880	(0.2536)	0.2257	(0.1476)	0.3917	(0.2653)
Other Sec-F Sec-M	0.5245	(0.4376)	0.2101	(0.3022)	0.4271	(0.4439)
Other Sec-F Univ-M	1.2925*	(0.5695)	1.1217	(0.8142)	0.5007	(1.1629)
Other Univ-F PrimComp-M	2.3035***	(0.0565)	2.3326***	(0.0493)		
Other Univ-F Sec-M	0.8181***	(0.0765)	0.8789***	(0.0489)		
Other Univ-F Univ-M	0.6947	(0.5301)	-0.6626	(0.4033)	0.7132	(0.5573)

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	Full sample		Sample excl. Philippines		Sample excl. Thailand	
	Model B (2)		Model B (4)		Model B (6)	
	coef	(se)	coef	(se)	coef	(se)
Observations	561,948		474,733		498,447	
R-squared	0.7565		0.7550		0.7536	
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$						

Table C. Robustness of Model B to Removing Philippines and Thailand from Sample

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